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INVESTIGATING ONLINE THREATS IN
THE DIGITAL AGE
INTRODUCTION
n August 16, 2014, Zoe Quinn was drawn into one of the
most extensive incidents of cyberharassment in the
United States when her ex-boyfriend, Eron Gjoni, posted a series
of blog posts depicting, in meticulous detail, a story of how Quinn
previously cheated on him.1 The blog posts included intimate in-
formation that Quinn sent Gjoni in confidence, private Facebook
correspondence between the two over the span of their relation-
ship, and subjective commentary on the relationship by Gjoni.
In his commentary, Gjoni included accusations that Quinn re-
ceived acclaim for her self-published video game, Depression
Quest, as a result of her affairs.2 The accusations that Quinn re-
ceived positive reviews for her video game as a result of her re-
lationship with a video game journalist were soon proven false,
as the man with whom she had an affair did not actually review
her video game.3 This, however, did not stop numerous Internet
users from responding angrily to the blog posts.4 In retaliation
1. Eron Gjoni, TheZoePost, WORDPRESS (Aug. 6, 2014), https://thezoe-
post.wordpress.com.
2. Id.; Caitlin Dewey, The Only Guide to Gamergate You Will Ever Need to
Read, WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
intersect/wp/2014/10/14/the-only-guide-to-gamergate-you-will-ever-need-to-
read. Gjoni’s publishing of private information could constitute cyberharass-
ment, depending on the jurisdiction one examines. See infra Parts I, II.
3. See Abigail Elise,What is the GamerGate Scandal? Female Game Devel-
oper Flees Home Amid Online Threats, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2014, 3:27
PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/what-gamergate-scandal-female-game-devel-
oper-flees-home-amid-online-threats-1704046.
4. Numerous Internet users banded together in a movement called
#Gamergate. See id. Allegedly formed to address ethics in journalism as a re-
sult of Quinn’s affair, #Gamergate became associated with repeated attacks
against Quinn and other female game developers or journalists who publically
supported Quinn. See id.; see also Dewey, supra note 2.
O
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to her alleged behavior and favored treatment, anonymous hack-
ers5 released Quinn’s personal information (including her home
address, her phone number, and private nude photographs) to
the public.6 Quinn also received numerous rape threats and
threats of violence, and Quinn’s website faced multiple hacking
attempts.7 Ultimately, Quinn fled her home and sought a re-
straining order against Gjoni, which was quickly challenged in
court.8
Cybercrimes that involve online harassment, such as cyber-
harassment and cyberstalking, are becoming ever more preva-
lent as people become more and more active on the Internet.9 In
particular, in 2012 alone, at least nine million women reported
5. While not a focus of this Note, Internet mobs (e.g., groups of people
online who commit harassment or stalking campaigns online) are also becom-
ing increasingly important to address, in and of themselves, through additional
legislation, due to the proliferation of Internet usage across the globe. For fur-
ther information about Internet mobs, see Michael Barrett Zimmerman, One-
Off & Off-Hand: Developing an Appropriate Course of Liability in Threatening
Online Mass Communication Events, 32 CARDOZOARTS&ENT. L.J. 1027, 1036–
42 (2014).
6. Elise, supra note 3; Dewey, supra note 2; Sarah Kaplan, With
#GamerGate, the Video-Game Industry’s Growing Pains Go Viral, WASH. POST
(Sept. 12, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-
mix/wp/2014/09/12/with-gamergate-the-video-game-industrys-growing-pains-
go-viral.
7. See Kaplan, supra note 6.
8. See Dewey, supra note 2; Eugene Volokh, ‘You Are Also Ordered Not to




9. In many countries, including but not limited to the United States, the
United Kingdom, and India, instances of cyberharassment and cyberstalking
are on the rise. See CARSTEN MAPLE, EMMA SHORT, & ANTONY BROWN,
CYBERSTALKING IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 15 (2011),
http://www.beds.ac.uk/__data/as-
sets/pdf_file/0003/83109/ECHO_Pilot_Final.pdf; Karen McVeigh, Cyberstalk-
ing ‘Now More Common’ Than Face-to-Face Stalking, GUARDIAN (Apr. 8, 2011,
1:31 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/apr/08/cyberstalking-study-
victims-men; AmritaMadhukalya,Online Harassment of Women is on the Rise,
DNA (July 29, 2014, 6:20 AM), http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-online-
harassment-of-women-is-on-the-rise-2006090; Stefan Hankin, The Rise of
Online Harassment, POLITICUS (June 27, 2014), http://thepoliticus.com/con-
tent/rise-online-harassment.
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being a victim of cyberstalking in the European Union,10 and at
least 1.5 million U.S. citizens reported being victims of cyberhar-
assment in 2010.11 Both average citizens and celebrities alike
have become targets of online attacks.12
Legal remedies for victims of cyberharassment and cyberstalk-
ing, however, can be limited.13 For example, in Massachusetts
(Quinn’s state of residence), prosecutors would be unable to win
a cyberharassment case against Gjoni because of the narrow
statutory definition of harassment.14 Additionally, while Quinn
10. Katherine Quarmby, How the Law is Standing Up to Cyberstalking,
NEWSWEEK (Aug. 13, 2014, 6:08 AM),
http://www.newsweek.com/2014/08/22/how-law-standing-cyberstalking-
264251.html.
11. Bennet Kelley, The Unbearable Unawareness of Cyber-Harassment,
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 27, 2010, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffing-
tonpost.com/bennet-kelley/the-unbearable-unawarenes_b_434484.html.
12. See Dewey, supra note 2; Caitlin Dewey, A Vengeful Internet Trashed
the Yelp Page of the Minnesota Dentist Who Shot Cecil the Lion, WASH. POST
(July 28, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-inter-
sect/wp/2015/07/28/a-vengeful-internet-trashed-the-yelp-page-of-the-minne-
sota-dentist-who-shot-cecil-the-lion/; Nick Watt, Celebrities and Cyberstalkers:
The Dark Side of Fame in the Internet Age, ABC NEWS (July 9, 2012),
http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/celebrities-cyberstalkers-dark-side-fame-
internet-age/story?id=16741230; Hayley Tsukayama, Twitter Vows to “Im-
prove Our Policies” After Robin Williams’ Daughter is Bullied Off the Network,
WASH. POST (Aug. 13, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
switch/wp/2014/08/13/twitter-vows-to-improve-our-policies-after-robin-wil-
liams-daughter-is-bullied-off-the-network/.
13. Volokh, supra note 8.
14. Massachusetts law requires “willfully and maliciously engaging in a
knowing pattern of conduct or series of acts over a period of time.” MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 265, § 43A(a) (LexisNexis 2016) (emphasis added). Massachusetts
courts have ruled that at least three acts committed on different days can con-
stitute a series of acts over a period of time (see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Welch,
444 Mass. 80, 89 (2005); Commonwealth v. Robinson, 444 Mass. 102, 109
(2005)) but have not, so far, indicated whether multiple blog posts published
in succession on the same day (e.g., as Gjoni’s original posts were published)
would qualify as “a knowing pattern . . . or series of acts.” ch. 265, § 43A(a). In
fact, in Robinson, the court described the defendant’s act of stopping his car
near the victim twice in the same day to glare “menacingly” at her as being
part of one “incident.” Robinson, 444 Mass. at 109. This would suggest that
repetition of the same form of harassment, in the same day, may not fall under
the state’s definition of a pattern or series of acts over a period of time. Even if
the actions had occurred on different days, however, it would still be difficult
to prove malicious or similar intent in cases involving online harassment. See
infra Part III.
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did attempt to obtain a restraining order against Gjoni in Mas-
sachusetts state court15 to prevent him from speaking further
about Quinn’s personal life or any other details that would fur-
ther fuel online harassment against her, this restraining order
is currently being challenged on First Amendment grounds.16
Legal scholars have argued, for example, that Gjoni has a First
Amendment right to talk about his relationship with Quinn and
to talk about Quinn herself, and that his right to do so should
not be stifled by what other malicious actors do with that infor-
mation.17 If the unconstitutionality argument proves to be per-
suasive to the court, Quinn would also be unable to maintain a
restraining order against Gjoni to prevent him from disclosing
additional private conversations between himself and Quinn.18
If Quinn cannot maintain such a restraining order, other victims
may not be able to use restraining orders to prevent people from
disseminating personal information about them online.
15. Volokh, supra note 8 (“[A] Massachusetts trial court issued an order
providing that Gjoni is ‘Ordered not to post any further information about the
[plaintiff] or her personal life on line or to encourage ‘hate mobs.’”).
16. Eugene Volokh and Aaron Caplan helped file a “friend-of-the-court
brief” in the case (now at the appellate level). See id. Volokh argued against a
restraining order Quinn filed against Gjoni, arguing that preventing Gjoni
from posting anything about Quinn, her personal life, or anything that would
encourage further hate mobs would constitute “unconstitutional prior re-
straint.” See id. Prior restraint generally refers to a judicial prohibition or re-
striction on particular expression, such as an injunction on speaking on a par-
ticular matter. See generally Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d
242, 248 (7th Cir. 1975). Thus, Volokh’s argument, therefore, was that prevent-
ing Gjoni from talking about Quinn would be an unconstitutional judicial ex-
ercise in restricting Gjoni’s speech, and therefore that a restraining order pre-
venting Gjoni from speaking about Quinn would be unconstitutional.
17. See Volokh, supra note 8.
18. Volokh argues that there are “many possible legal actions that might be
contemplated here.” Id. Many of these options fall outside the focus of this
Note. It should be noted, however, that Volokh acknowledges that many of the
suggestions he provides are also unrealistic for someone in Quinn’s position.
For example, Volokh concedes that, though Quinn could sue for disclosure of
her personal information, “the ‘disclosure of private facts’ tort . . . is quite nar-
row and complex.” Id. Further, “it’s often hard to track . . . down [people who
send death threats],” and though in theory one can already be convicted of a
crime to incite others to perform criminal conduct against another, “that’s an
extremely narrow First Amendment exception.” Id. Volokh’s concession that
his alternative options depend on relying on difficult and narrow rules and ex-
ceptions punctuate why existing law is ill-equipped to help victims like Quinn.
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Pursuing legal remedies against anonymous hackers who re-
lease personal information or send death threats can be ham-
pered by law enforcement’s lack of motivation to use limited re-
sources to identify anonymous actors.19A former Federal Bureau
of Investigations (FBI) supervisory special agent previously in-
volved with cybercrimes investigations suggested that the
unique difficulties of tracking anonymous perpetrators of cyber-
harassment, coupled with minor punishments for such crimes,
discourage officials from taking certain steps to fully investigate
cyberharassment cases.20 Identifying perpetrators requires the
use of computer forensics specialists to trace a user’s online ac-
count to their actual identity (e.g., through their Internet Proto-
col (IP) address or through more complicated means when an IP
address is not enough to definitively identify the user).21 This
identification process can be time-intensive and requires train-
ing or contracts with outside investigative agencies, which can
result in significant cost to law enforcement agencies.22 Because
punishments for cyberharassment often do not justify the time
and resources required to identify a potential harasser, local po-
lice and FBI agents are less likely to prioritize state or federal
cases (respectfully) against people who anonymously commit
online crimes.23 Investigations, however, can be essential for es-
tablishing the basic elements of laws that criminalize online har-
assment and stalking and for ultimately bringing successful
cases against perpetrators of online harassment and stalking.
For example, when threats are anonymous, it can be difficult to
determine whether the threats are the result of a single person
issuing multiple threats or whether each threat is a singular in-
stance of different users lashing out at a victim. This distinction
19. Amanda Hess, A Former FBI Agent on Why It’s So Hard to Prosecute





21. Caitlin Dewey, Why is it Taking so Long to Identify the Anonymous
Gamergate Trolls?, WASH. POST (Oct. 17, 2014), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2014/10/17/why-is-it-taking-so-long-to-
identify-the-anonymous-gamergate-trolls.
22. Hess, supra note 19.
23. According to former FBI agent Tim Ryan, “[s]pending a month getting
subpoenas and doing wiretaps for a case where the sentence is six months of
probation just doesn’t make sense.” Hess, supra note 19.
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can be a crucial element to prove in a criminal case, as many
states require the threats to be of a specific nature (i.e., to in-
volve multiple threats, to involve one perpetrator, or to involve
multiple perpetrators) before a crime has been committed.24 It
therefore becomes that much harder to prove a cyberharassment
or cyberstalking case when law enforcement is uninterested in
spending large amounts of time or resources to investigate a po-
tential crime that carries a low-level sentence.
Even if a victim’s local law enforcement is willing to use their
resources to identify cyberharassers and cyberstalkers, trying to
understand one’s legal recourse can be daunting for persons han-
dling such cases.25 Specifically, a complete lack of a unified
standard for cyberharassment and cyberstalking crimes across
various jurisdictions in the United States and across the globe
(particularly when cyberharassers and cyberstalkers can exist
in any jurisdiction in the world) can lead to some ambiguity and
inconsistency as to how various courts may treat a given cyber-
harassment or cyberstalking case.26 State and federal jurisdic-
tions of the United States have widely varying definitions of
cyberharassment and cyberstalking as well as different stand-
ards for determining the intent of the accused.27 In the United
States, while there are some statutes that cover certain forms of
cyberharassment and cyberstalking, existing state statutes can
vary widely from state to state (causing inconsistencies in how
victims, cyberharassers, and cyberstalkers are treated under the
law). Further, the few federal statutes available to address
cyberharassment and cyberstalking are either inadequate for
addressing what Quinn and many other victims have faced, or
have been made even more difficult to prove or interpret by re-
cent court decisions.28 In countries such as Canada, there is a
24. Massachusetts law, as noted above, requires some “knowing pattern of
conduct or series of acts over a period of time.” MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, §
43A(a) (LexisNexis 2016) (emphasis added). If Quinn cannot prove that differ-
ent instances of harassment came from the same person, then she cannot prove
that any of the anonymous users conducted a pattern of harassment or com-
mitted several acts of harassment.
25. See Aimee Fukuchi, A Balance of Convenience: The Use of Burden-Shift-
ing Devices in Criminal Cyberharassment Law, 52 B.C. L. REV. 289 (2011).
26. See id.
27. State Legislation, KIDSBESAFEONLINE (2009),
http://www.kidsbesafeonline.com/state-legislation.html.
28. See infra Part II.A; see also Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001
(2015).
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similar range of variance between federal and provincial laws.29
Internationally, there is no treaty that would allow a victim such
as Quinn to seek remedies from any international cyberhar-
assers or cyberstalkers who attacked her.30 The Council of Eu-
rope’s Convention on Cybercrime is the leading cybercrime
treaty, but handles a very narrow subset of cybercrimes that do
not fully include different forms of online harassment.31
Thus, an analysis of numerous examples of cyberharassment
and cyberstalking laws in the world can provide a guide for re-
forming U.S. laws specifically, and cyberharassment and cyber-
stalking laws generally. For example, examining the numerous
laws in the United States, including various state laws and fed-
eral laws, such as the Interstate Communications Act (ICA), the
Communications Act (“CA”), and the Interstate Stalking Pun-
ishment and Prevention Act (ISPPA) can offer strategies for
amending existing laws to ensure U.S. citizens, like Zoe Quinn,
have legal recourse for online attacks.32 Examining Canada’s re-
cent battles with online harassment with respect to its federal
Criminal Code, Nova Scotia’s Cyber-Safety Act (CSA), and On-
tario’s civil tort law have demonstrated the extent to which con-
cerns relating to First Amendment rights interact with the goals
of protecting victims from online harms, thus offering glimpses
into potential pitfalls of passing similar statutes in the United
States.33 Finally, examining Australia’s federal cyberharass-
ment law (in particular, its sentencing structure, its intent
standards, and its overall definition of cyberharassment and cy-
berstalking crimes) can provide insight into an alternative legal
framework that offers potential solutions to a number of the is-
sues faced by other jurisdictions struggling to address cyberhar-
assment and cyberstalking.34 Existing laws demonstrate both
the extent to which individual nations, and the world at large,
have to go in terms of enacting helpful cyberharassment and cy-
berstalking legislation and potential avenues for better address-
ing such crimes.
29. See infra Part III.B.1.
30. See infra Part II.B.1.
31. Details of Treaty No.185, COUNCIL EUR., http://www.coe.int/en/web/con-
ventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/185 (last visited Jan. 17, 2017).
32. See infra Part III.A.
33. See infra Part III.B.1.
34. See infra Part III.B.2.
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In trying to address the widely different and sometimes prob-
lematic definitions of cyberharassment and cyberstalking, and
in trying to motivate law enforcement to investigate cyberhar-
assment and cyberstalking crimes, this Note proposes a U.S.
Federal Model Statute (“Model Statute”) that uses elements of
laws enacted throughout the United States and in otherWestern
countries, such as Canada and Australia, to consolidate defini-
tions of cyberharassment and cyberstalking into one federal law
and to amend sentencing structures for existing law to motivate
law enforcement to investigate such crimes. Specifically, the pro-
posed Model Statute is designed to move the United States to-
ward an objective standard for these cybercrimes (i.e., a stand-
ard that relies on what a reasonable person would believe or per-
ceive, rather than what the persons in the alleged incident sub-
jectively believed or perceived), making it easier to prosecute
anonymous persons for whom intent may be difficult to prove.
Additionally, the proposed Model Statute is designed to make
investigations of these cybercrimes more palpable for U.S. law
enforcement by conforming and raising statutory punishments
for cyberharassment and cyberstalking to be consistent with
those enacted by other Western countries (such as Australia35
and Canada36).
Part I of this Note will examine the current state of cyberhar-
assment and cyberstalking legislation in the United States and
abroad, including ways in which cyberharassment and cyber-
stalking are defined and examples of how such cybercrimes can
affect victims in ways that traditional crimes may not. Part II of
this Note will look at existing laws in the United States and
abroad—such as state and provincial laws within the United
States and Canada, respectively, federal laws within the United
35. The Australian legal system provides an interesting glimpse into how to
address attacks across state lines (or potentially even attacks across national
lines) and sentencing schemes that may help law enforcement justify prioriti-
zation of cybercrimes. For example, Australian federal cybercrime laws include
provisions for prosecuting crimes involving out-of-state parties and a tiered-
sentencing system. See generally infra Part II.B.2.
36. Canada serves as a useful case study on potential First Amendment
challenges to cyberharassment statutes that criminalize extremely broad cat-
egories of online harassment, which has the effect of limiting speech. See gen-
erally Halifax Lawyer to Launch Charter Case Challenge of Cyber-Safety Act,
CBCNEWS (Aug. 15, 2015, 4:08 PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/nova-sco-
tia/halifax-lawyer-to-launch-charter-case-challenge-of-cyber-safety-act-
1.3192440.
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States, Canada, and Australia, and an international treaty—
that attempt to address cyberharassment and cyberstalking.
Specifically, Part II will assess the wide variety of definitions of
cyberharassment and cyberstalking that exist both within na-
tions and between nations as well as the different ways in which
jurisdictions punish cyberharassers and cyberstalkers. Part III
of this Note will discuss how the laws in the United States and
Canada fail to adequately address issues arising from the prev-
alence of cyberharassment and cyberstalking (e.g., by failing to
cover certain forms of cyberharassment and cyberstalking or by
including provisions that impact the enforceability of the appli-
cable laws). Part IV of this Note will propose a Model Statute to
provide uniformity in applying cyberharassment and cyberstalk-
ing laws to U.S. citizens and to address the ambivalence by law
enforcement to investigate instances of cyberharassment and cy-
berstalking.
I. BACKGROUND OF CYBERHARASSMENT AND CYBERSTALKING
Innovations of Internet technology have created new tactics
and forms of harassment that were not feasible, or even possible,
in instances of offline harassment. Understanding the ways in
which the Internet can fundamentally change the nature of har-
assment (including how it is conducted, its prevalence, and its
effects on its victims) is crucial to understanding how to prevent
instances of future cyberharassment and cyberstalking.
A. Definitions of Cyberharassment and Cyberstalking
Cyberharassment has been defined in various ways by differ-
ent scholars,37 but is generally defined as “the use of email, in-
stant messaging, and derogatory websites to bully or otherwise
harass an individual or group through personal attacks.”38 The
term “cyberharassment” can be considered synonymous with
“cyberstalking,”39 where cyberstalking generally refers to
37. See Defining a Cyberbully: Social Scientists Struggle to Characterize
New Form of Harassment, NAT’L SCI. FOUND. (Nov. 8, 2011), http://nsf.gov/dis-
coveries/disc_summ.jsp?cntn_id=121847&org=NSF.
38. Cyber Harassment Law and Legal Definition, USLEGAL, http://defini-
tions.uslegal.com/c/cyber-harassment/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2017).
39. See Cyberbullying/Stalking & Harassment, WIREDSAFETY (2012),
https://www.wiredsafety.org/subjects/cyberbullying.php.
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“threatening, harassing, or annoying someone” in repeated en-
counters.40 In other words, cyberharassment may include a one-
time incident of name-calling, threatening a victim, or releasing
private information, whereas cyberstalking includes multiple in-
stances of tracking a person online or committing multiple acts
of cyberharassment against a particular person.41
Cyberharassment and cyberstalking can also materialize in
different ways. Hacking attempts, publication of personal infor-
mation on the Internet, name-calling, rape threats, or other
threats of violence all constitute forms of cyberharassment.42 In
instances of cyberharassment or cyberstalking, a victim’s pri-
vate social media and text messages, real name, email address,
phone number, residential address, nude photographs, and
other such information may be posted online to encourage dis-
semination of the victim’s personal information.43 Cyberharass-
ment can be perpetrated by a single person44 or by a number of
persons acting against one or more victims.45 The accused can be
known to the victim or can be an anonymous entity that the vic-
tim cannot identify.46
Harassment and stalking in and of themselves are not new
crimes in U.S. discourse; their cyber counterparts, however, can
involve unique complications.47 While information can spread
without the use of technology, social media and other forms of
online communication allow information to be shared with a
40. Cyberstalking Law and Legal Definition, USLEGAL, http://defini-
tions.uslegal.com/c/cyberstalking/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2017).
41. See Cyberbullying/Stalking & Harassment, supra note 39. Cyberhar-
assment is not considered the same as “cyberbullying,” a term generally used
in the United States to describe conduct between minors. See id.
42. See Kaplan, supra note 6.
43. See Elise, supra note 3; Dewey, supra note 2; Kaplan, supra note 6.
44. In Zoe Quinn’s case, Gjoni arguably committed cyberharassment be-
cause he personally released several pages of private correspondence and other
information about Quinn’s private life. See Gjoni, supra note 1.
45. See Dewey, supra note 2.
46. See generally Quarmby, supra note 10. An anonymous perpetrator can
be more difficult to identify than a known perpetrator, causing additional costs
or training needs on the part of law enforcement or the victim to identify per-
sons so that legal remedies can be pursued. As noted above, if law enforcement
lacks the resources to investigate a cyberharassment case, they are unlikely to
prioritize it over other types of cases. See Hess, supra note 19.
47. See JAMESGRIMMELMANN, INTERNETLAW: CASES ANDPROBLEMS 159 (5th
ed. 2015).
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simple click of a button.48 Thus, because distribution of content
on the Internet is easier and faster than its nondigital equiva-
lents, threats and personal information shared without permis-
sion can persist online longer, can be shared faster, can be
viewed by more people in a shorter span of time, and can be
searchable by using search engines or other means.49 Further-
more, cybercrimes are not constrained by geography; perpetra-
tors can harass or stalk online victims across state or even na-
tional lines.50
Additionally, the Internet can cause new complications in
terms of identifying perpetrators. Online profiles are typically
anonymous, as people often use online pseudonyms instead of
their real identities.51 In the context of cyberharassment, a 2014
study by Pew Research Center indicated that at least 26 percent
of respondents did not know the real identity of their harasser
at all, and 38 percent of respondents indicated that their har-
asser had been a stranger to them.52 Normally, law enforcement
attempts to counteract this by determining the IP address of
anonymous users.53 When the user’s device is connected to the
Internet, an IP address serves as a unique identifier linked to a
48. See id. at 159–60.
49. See id.
50. See Quarmby, supra note 10.
51. Martin Clear, Why Should I Reveal My ‘Real Identity’ Online? Anonym-
ity Isn’t So Terrible, GUARDIAN (Jan. 15, 2014, 7:21 AM), http://www.theguard-
ian.com/commentisfree/2014/jan/15/reveal-real-identity-online-anonymity.
52. SeeMaeve Duggan, Online Harassment, PEWRES. CENT. (Oct. 22, 2014),
http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2014/10/PI_OnlineHarassment_72815.pdf.
Perhaps surprisingly, only 10% of respondents indicated that the harasser was
a previous romantic partner. Id. at 26. In a different 2013 study, 51% of victims
of cyberstalking were single, and 60% of victims of cyberstalking were women.
See 2013 Cyberstalking Statistics, WORKING TO HALT ONLINE ABUSE,
http://www.haltabuse.org/resources/stats/2013Statistics.pdf (last visited Feb.
12, 2017); McVeigh, supra note 9. Though only 10% of respondents indicated
that an ex-partner was their harasser, the study indicated that 47% of cyber-
stalkers in particular were ex-partners. See 2013 Cyberstalking Statistics, su-
pra note 52. This meant, however, that 30% of respondents in the study were
harassed or stalked online by an anonymous cyberharasser or cyberstalker.
See 2013 Cyberstalking Statistics, supra note 52; McVeigh, supra note 9.
53. See GRIMMELMANN, supra note 47, at 292. For more information on IP
addresses, see Rus Shuler, How Does the Internet Work?, SHULERS (2005),
http://www.theshulers.com/whitepapers/internet_whitepaper/index.html; IP
Address, TECH TERMS http://techterms.com/definition/ipaddress (last updated
Sept. 21, 2016); J. Touch, Updated Specification of the IPv4 ID Field,
TOOLS.IETF.ORG (Feb. 2013), https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6864.
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user’s device, allowing law enforcement to identify a user
(through the device) even if one is utilizing an online pseudo-
nym.54 It is possible, however, for users to forge their IP address;
the IP address, therefore, may not always be a reliable means to
identify a particular user.55 Additionally, there are various tech-
nologies that can be used to mask one’s IP address.56 For exam-
ple, an Internet user can send messages through a “proxy,” such
that the message appears to come from an alternate, proxy de-
vice instead of from the user’s device.57 A user can use multiple
proxies to further obfuscate her IP address.58 As a result of these
unique and complex ways to circumvent identification technol-
ogy, law enforcement must typically hire employees with exper-
tise in Internet technology and investigations of online criminal
activity to identify perpetrators of cyberharassment and cyber-
stalking.59 The prevalence of anonymous users abusing their vic-
tims thus demonstrates why it is crucial to implement measures
that encourage law enforcement to investigate these crimes,
even when additional resources, such as employees or training,
will be necessary to investigate the crimes.
B. Effects of Cyberharassment and Cyberstalking
Cyberharassment can affect people of all genders, ages, and
races, though some forms of cyberharassment can affect certain
demographics more than others.60 In a 2014 Pew Research Cen-
ter survey,61 44 percent of men and 37 percent of women indi-
cated that they had experienced some form of online harassment
54. See GRIMMELMANN, supra note 47, at 292; see also Shuler, supra note 53;
IP Address, supra note 53; Touch, supra note 53.
55. See GRIMMELMANN, supra note 47, at 292.
56. See Stefan Larsson et al., Law, Norms, Piracy and Online Anonymity:
Practices of De-identification in the Global File Sharing Community, 6 J. RES.
INTERACTIVEMARKETING 260, 263 (2012).
57. Id.; see alsoChris Hoffman,How to Browse Anonymously with Tor, HOW-
TO-GEEK (May 15, 2012), http://www.howtogeek.com/114004/how-to-browse-
anonymously-with-tor/.
58. See Larsson et al., supra note 56; Hoffman, supra note 57. It should be
noted that such services, known as Tor services, frequently do serve purposes
other than shielding Internet users from criminal liability. For more infor-
mation on Tor services specifically, see Tor: Overview, TORPROJECT,
https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en (last visited Jan. 17, 2016).
59. See Hess, supra note 19.
60. SeeDuggan, supra note 52; 2013 Cyberstalking Statistics, supra note 52.
61. The Pew Research Center is a U.S. nonpartisan organization that con-
ducts “public opinion polling, demographic research, media content analysis
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in their lifetime.62 Men were more likely to experience less se-
vere forms of harassment,63 such as name-calling and embar-
rassment, while women were more likely to experience extreme
forms of online harassment, such as stalking or sexual harass-
ment.64 Different genders may also often experience different
fears associated with cyberharassment and cyberstalking.65 For
example, women are more likely to fear physical violence to
themselves or to their loved ones.66 On the other hand, men are
more likely to fear damage to their reputation.67
The effects of cyberstalking can also be as varied as they can
be severe. Victims can experience anxiety, a loss of personal
safety, defamation of their character, damage to their profes-
sional reputation, alienation from their community, difficulties
in child custody and other legal proceedings, depression, panic
and other empirical social science research.” Duggan, supra note 52, at 1. The
Pew Research Center establishes nationally representative panels of randomly
selected U.S. adults to solicit survey participants. See id. at 62. The Online
Harassment survey referenced herein, in particular, was self-administered via
the internet by 2,849 Internet users included in such a panel between May 30
and June 30, 2014. See id. at 9. This number equated to approximately 60 per-
cent of online panel participants. Id. at 63. The Pew Research Center calcu-
lated a margin of error of ±2.4. Id. at 9.
62. Id. at 13. The six forms of online harassment tracked in the survey in-
clude: “[n]ame-calling and embarrassment . . . sexual harassment, physical
threats, sustained harassment, and stalking.” Id. at 12.
63. While, in comparison, men do not face more severe forms of harassment
as often as women, men unmistakably can also face vicious forms of harass-
ment. In 2015, after becoming notorious for luring and killing a protected lion
from a sanctuary, anonymous Internet users relentlessly harassed Walter
Palmer in retaliation for his actions. See Lisa Green, Walter Palmer, Cecil the
Lion, and the Legality of Cyber-Bullying, MSNBC (Aug. 10, 2015, 8:14 AM),
http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/walter-palmer-cecil-the-lion-and-the-legality-
cyber-bullying; Dewey, supra note 12. The anonymous users littered his dental
practice’s Yelp page with death threats and other negative reviews, hacked his
practice’s dental website so that it would redirect to a fake Twitter account,
and even vandalized his South Florida home and dental office. See Green, su-
pra note 63; Dewey, supra note 12.
64. See Duggan, supra note 52, at 13. The same report also indicates that
persons aged 18–24, and African-Americans and Latinos generally, are more
likely to face harassment than their peers.
65. SeeMcVeigh, supra note 9.
66. See id.
67. See id.
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attacks, and suicidal thoughts.68 In a 2010 U.K. survey jointly
conducted by the Network for Surviving Stalking and the Na-
tional Centre for Cyberstalking Research, a third of respondents
indicated that they suffered clinical Post-Traumatic Stress Dis-
order (PTSD) as a result of experiencing cyberstalking.69 In a
2012 Australian research study, 84 percent of participants also
reported depression, sleeplessness, weight loss, anxiety, panic
attacks, and other symptoms of PTSD.70 In addition, victims of
severe cyberharassment and cyberstalking may fear for their
safety or the safety of their families, resulting in some being
driven from their homes.71 In response, some victims of cyber-
harassment limit their online interactions to avoid harassment,
limit their offline behavior to prevent perpetrators from obtain-
ing more information about them for use in future incidents, or
limit their offline behavior, so as to avoid subsequent offline har-
assment that stems from their online harassment.72 For exam-
ple, some victims do not attend class to avoid having their
whereabouts posted online, while other victims carry weapons
out of fear of offline attacks.73
Given the prevalence of cyberharassment, the ubiquitous na-
ture of the Internet across the globe,74 and the unique challenges
68. See Julie Dare, Cyberharassment and Online Defamation: A Default
Form of Regulations?, 11 TRANSFORMATIONS, 2005, http://www.transfor-
mationsjournal.org/journal/issue_11/article_04.shtml; DANIELLE KEATS
CITRON, HATECRIMES INCYBER SPACE 10–20 (2014).
69. McVeigh, supra note 9.
70. DELANIEWOODLOCK, TECHNOLOGY-FACILITATED STALKING: FINDINGS AND
RESOURCES FROM THE SMARTSAFE PROJECT (2013),
http://www.smartsafe.org.au/sites/default/files/SmartSafe-Findings-Book-
let.pdf.
71. Aside from Zoey Quinn, who was driven from her home due to fear from
online threats, another female game developer, Brianna Wu, and video game
critic, Anita Sarkeesian, similarly were both driven from their homes due to
threats against their lives and against their family members. See Elise, supra
note 3; Dewey, supra note 2; Kaplan, supra note 6.
72. Danielle Keats Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in Combating Cyber Gen-
der Harassment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 373, 385 (2009).
73. See id. at 382, 385.
74. Respectively, 87.9% of the North American population and 73.2% of the
Oceania population use the Internet. Internet Usage Statistics: The Internet
Big Picture, INTERNET WORLD STATS (Nov. 30, 2015), http://www.internet-
worldstats.com/stats.htm [hereinafter Internet Usage Statistics]. Internet us-
age has grown by over 7,231% in Africa, over 1,319% in Asia, over 3,649% in
the Middle East, and over 1,808% in South America between 2000 and 2015.
Id.
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that people face in dealing with cyberharassment, it is crucial
that current laws specifically address online harassment as op-
posed to general harassment. Many Internet users are victims
of various forms of cyberharassment. Cyberharassment also has
profound effects on its victims, which, in many ways, are more
complex than the effects of offline harassment due to the perva-
siveness of the Internet and the persistence of data posted on the
Internet.75 Clear and concise laws relating to cyberharassment
are thus necessary to ensure that victims have recourse beyond
hiding in or fleeing their homes.
II. EXISTING CYBERHARASSMENT AND CYBERSTALKING LAWS
ACROSS THEGLOBE
Determining standards for handling cybercrimes can be a dif-
ficult endeavor when laws relating to such crimes vary greatly
both domestically and internationally. There can be differences
in how the crime itself is defined, how standards of intent are
used to analyze the perpetrator’s actions, which standards are
used to analyze the victim’s harm, and the types of punishments
allocated to those who commit the crime.76 Creating a unified
framework through which to analyze cyberharassment and cy-
berstalking cases necessarily involves reconciling these different
laws. This Part will examine three U.S. federal laws (the ICA,
the CA, and the ISPPA) that generally regulate interstate com-
munications and combat cyberharassment and cyberstalking.
These federal laws will provide a survey of how U.S. state laws
differ in the ways they address (or do not address) particular
forms of cyberharassment and cyberstalking. This Part will also
analyze the Convention on Cybercrime and Canadian and Aus-
tralian federal and provincial laws and the challenges associated
with enacting cyberharassment and cyberstalking legislation
that does not conflict with First Amendment rights and Aus-
tralia’s sentencing structures. These examples can inform how
the United States can successfully amend its federal and state
laws to address these issues with current laws.
75. See Merritt Baer, “Cyberstalking and the Internet Landscape We Have
Constructed,” 15 VA. J.L. & TECH. 153, 154–58 (2010); Traci Pedersen, Cyber-
stalking Worse Than Stalking?, PSYCHCENTRAL (Jan. 25, 2015),
http://psychcentral.com/news/2015/01/25/cyberstalking-worse-than-stalk-
ing/80350.html.
76. State Legislation, supra note 27.
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A. Defining Cyberharassment and Cyberstalking in the United
States
The United States uses multiple federal statutes to address a
limited subset of cyberharassment and cyberstalking crimes.
Many states also have their own laws that cover various subsets
of cyberharassment and cyberstalking crimes. This Part will
first discuss U.S. federal laws and what those laws do or do not
cover. This Part will then address U.S. state laws, what they
cover, and how they vary.
1. Federal Laws
The U.S. federal government relies on several laws to prose-
cute certain forms of cyberharassment.77 One such law is the
ICA.78 The ICA primarily intends to prohibit intentional extor-
tion across state lines, including threats of harm sent to others
over the Internet and threats generally sent with the intent to
extort.79 The scope of the law, however, is limited to extortion
specifically and does not focus on intentional injury to others in
a general sense.80 Further, the ICA, and many other statutes
that reference threats specifically, only cover true threats (also
known as “credible threats”).81 In a nutshell, a “true threat” is a
threat that, by its nature, would cause a reasonable person to
reasonably fear that the threat will be carried out (even if the
person making the threat does not actually intend to carry out
the threat).82 True threat standards can make prosecution of
threats over the Internet (especially anonymous threats) partic-
ularly difficult, as it is impossible for a victim to know for certain
77. See Baer, supra note 75, at 154–58; Naomi Harlin Goodno, Cyberstalk-
ing, A New Crime: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Current State and Federal
Laws, 72 MO. L. REV. 125, 148 (2007); Fukuchi, supra note 25, at 299.
78. Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015). The ICA does not specif-
ically refer to the Internet or online behavior but makes illegal all communica-
tions sent “in interstate or foreign commerce” that contains a threat to kidnap
or injure another person. See 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2016).
79. The ICA also falls under the Extortion and Threats chapter of the Title
18 statute, further indicating that the law is intended to deal with extortion
and related threats, above all else. A subsequent attempt to amend the statute
to include conduct performed “with the intent to coerce, intimidate, harass, or
cause substantial emotional distress . . . using electronic means” ultimately
failed. See H.R. Res. 1966, 111th Cong. (2009).
80. See United States v. Cooper, 523 F.2d 8 (6th Cir. 1975).
81. Goodno, supra note 77, at 148; see also Zimmerman, supra note 5.
82. See generally Zimmerman, supra note 5; Goodno, supra note 77, at 148.
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whether an anonymous perpetrator has the means to carry out
a threat until the perpetrator is identified and located.83 Thus,
there are numerous forms of harassment that fall outside the
language of the law, including threats that do not fulfill a true
threat standard, defamation,84 and the release of personal infor-
mation without consent.85 Further, by the time an investigation
reveals the identity and location of a perpetrator, damage to the
victim (e.g., fear instilled in the victim, financial loss caused by
investigating the message, or other such losses) would have al-
ready occurred.86
Additionally, the requisite intent of perpetrators under the
ICA has historically been ambiguous, at best.87 Three possible
standards of intent for the ICA include general intent (i.e., that
the accused intended to send communications that a reasonable
person would find threatening), recklessness (i.e., that the ac-
cused did not intend to threaten another person but acted in
such an egregious manner that he or she should have known
that his or her communications would be considered threaten-
ing), and specific intent (i.e., the accused intended to threaten
another person though his or her communications).88
83. See Baer, supra note 75, at 154–58; Goodno, supra note 77, at 135–36.
84. While the statute does allow perpetrators to be prosecuted if they send
threats to damage the reputation of another with the intent to extort, it does not
include language to prosecute perpetrators if they carry out the threat and
publish defamatory statements. 18. U.S.C. § 875(d) (2016) (emphasis added).
85. To their credit, the U.S. Supreme Court and several lower courts have
stretched the meaning of the law to attempt to fit threats and threatening lan-
guage, whether or not it is extortionist in nature. For example, in Elonis, the
defendant posted threatening language on his Facebook page, but he arguably
did not intend to extort the parties that he wrote about. See Elonis v. United
States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015). 2001. Without a threat of some sort, however, it
is difficult for any court to reason that the harassment in question falls under
the confines of the statute.
86. Goodno, supra note 77, at 135–36.
87. Unfortunately, the legislative history of the ICA is as ambiguous as the
language of the statute itself. Scholars disagree as to whether amendments to
the ICA, which included new technologies and types of threats over the years,
removed the requirement of a subjective intent to threaten, and whether a
need to specify objective intent still remains. See Megan Chester, Lost in
Translation: The Case for the Addition of a Directness Test in Online True
Threat Analysis, 23 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 395, 404–05 (2015).
88. Michael Pierce, Prosecuting Online Threats After Elonis, 110 NW. U. L.
REV. ONLINE 51, 53–57 (2015).
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Prior to 2015, most circuit courts interpreted the ICA to in-
clude a general intent standard.89 In 2015, however, the U.S. Su-
preme Court ruled in Elonis v. United States that some criminal
intent on the part of the defendant is inherent in criminal stat-
utes (i.e., that, in the absence of a specified intent within the
language of a statute, a defendant’s intent when acting in a crim-
inal manner must carry some weight).90 In Elonis, the defend-
ant’s wife obtained a protection-from-abuse order against him.91
Subsequent to receiving the order, the defendant posted a mes-
sage on Facebook asking whether the protection-from-abuse or-
der would be able to stop a bullet.92 In that same post, the de-
fendant also threatened the authorities by stating that he had
enough explosives to defend himself against the state police if
his wife tried to enforce the order.93 The defendant continued to
write similar posts about his wife and other parties.94
89. See id. at 412.
90. See Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2012.
91. See id. at 2006.
92. The defendant’s message read: “Fold up your [protection-from-abuse or-
der] and put it in your pocket/Is it thick enough to stop a bullet?” Id. at 2006.
93. The defendant’s post read:
Try to enforce an Order/ that was improperly granted in the
first place/Me thinks the Judge needs an education/on true
threat jurisprudence/And prison time’ll add zeros to my set-
tlement. . . . /And if worse comes to worse/I’ve got enough ex-
plosives/to take care of the State Police and the Sheriff’s De-
partment.
Id. at 2006.
94. Elonis also posted: “That’s it, I’ve had enough/I’m checking out and mak-
ing a name for myself/Enough elementary schools in a ten mile radius/to initi-
ate the most heinous school shooting ever imagined/And hell hath no fury like
a crazy man in a Kindergarten class/The only question is . . . which one?” Id.
at 2006–07. In reference to a female FBI agent, Elonis wrote:
You know your s***’s ridiculous/when you have the FBI
knockin’ at yo’ door/Little Agent lady stood so close/Took all
the strength I had not to turn the b**** ghost/Pull my knife,
flick my wrist, and slit her throat/Leave her bleedin’ from her
jugular in the arms of her partner/[Laughter]/. . . . Cause lit-
tle did y’all know, I was strapped wit’ a bomb/Why did you
think it took me so long to get dressed with no shoes on?/I
was just waitin’ for y’all to handcuff me and pat me
down/Touch the detonator in my pocket and we’re all
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The U.S. Supreme Court determined that general intent can-
not be inferred from criminal statutes that do not explicitly spec-
ify an intent standard, as “wrongdoing must be conscious to be
criminal,” and . . . a defendant must be ‘blameworthy in mind’
before he can be found guilty.”95 Said another way, the U.S. Su-
preme Court ruled that, in the absence of a particular intent
standard being enumerated in a criminal statute, a defendant
must have conscious intent of somemanner to commit a criminal
act. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, failed to address what
criminal intent can and should be used in such statutes (or, spe-
cifically, what criminal intent should be used in evaluating de-
fendants’ communications under the ICA).96 Thus, rather than
confirming which intent standard can apply to the ICA, the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled that one possible intent standard was in-
applicable and that it need not decide yet which standards of
intent can be applied to the provisions of the ICA.97 It remains
unclear (both to prosecutors and defendants) what sort of intent
is necessary to violate the statute.
Two other U.S. federal laws commonly used in cyberharass-
ment and cyberstalking cases include the CA98 and the ISPPA.99
The CA covers obscene and harassing communications, and
goin’/[BOOM!]/Are all the pieces comin’ together?/S***, I’m
just a crazy sociopath. . . .
Id. at 2006–07.
95. Id. at 2003, 2012–13.
96. See id.
97. Pierce, supra note 88, at 59. While potentially frustrating to future liti-
gants, the U.S. Supreme Court’s refusal to discuss the merits of the reckless-
ness and specific intent standards is not without its own precedent. Courts
often attempt to refrain from ruling on matters that can still be determined
through the standard democratic procedures and which are outside the scope
of the case at hand. See Joseph Russomanno, Facebook Threats: The Missed
Opportunities of Elonis v. United States, 21 COMM. L. & POL’Y 1, 10–16 (2016).
98. 47 U.S.C.S. § 223 (2016). While originally drafted to handle telephone
communications, the statute was amended to include email communication in
2006. See Goodno, supra note 77, at 148. The statute now prohibits anony-
mously using a telecommunications device with the intent to abuse, threaten,
or harass a specific person or repeatedly communicating with a specific person
solely to harass that person. See 47 U.S.C.S. § 223(a)(1)(C), (E).
99. 18 U.S.C.S. § 2261A (2016); see also Fukuchi, supra note 25, at 299. An-
other law originally dealing with offline behavior, the ISPPA was amended in
2000 and subsequently was found to include interstate conduct performed over
the Internet. See Fukuchi, supra note 25, at 299; United States v. Bowker, 372
F.3d 365, 388 (6th Cir. 2004).
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thus, unlike the ICA, covers more than merely credible
threats.100 The CA specifies an intent requirement of specific in-
tent.101 In U.S. legal discourse, “specific intent” is generally de-
fined as a defendant’s actual intent to perform some act, wishing
for an expected consequence of the act to occur.102 Unlike the
ICA, the CA requires anonymous communications103 and for the
communications to be sent to a particular person.104 The CA,
therefore, does not cover instances of cyberharassment or cyber-
stalking that do not involve direct communication with a victim
(such as posting private information on a webpage) or instances
of cyberharassment or cyberstalking where the victim knows the
perpetrator. The ISPPA regulates stalking over state lines and
can be used to prosecute some forms of cyberstalking that in-
volve intimidating surveillance (including conduct that causes
victims to fear for their safety, to face substantive emotional dis-
tress).105 The ISPPA similarly requires the perpetrator to act
with specific intent.106 Specifically, the accused must have an
“intent to kill, injure, harass, intimidate, or place [the victim]
under surveillance with intent to kill, injure, harass, or intimi-
date another person.”107 It can, however, be difficult to prove the
intent of a defendant when the defendant harasses a victim
online and out of the purview of the victim. For example, Inter-
net conduct is generally divorced from body language, a vocal
tone, or other factors that could indicate what a person meant
when he or she made a statement, or took an action, online. The
more difficulty a prosecutor or victim has in determining these
factors, the more difficulty a prosecutor or victim will have in
proving that the defendant had any particular intent in saying
a particular statement to the victim or performing other actions
against the victim. Thus, the extent to which federal laws can
100. 47 U.S.C.S. § 223.
101. Id.
102. See Specific Intent, CORNELL U. L. SCH., https://www.law.cor-
nell.edu/wex/specific_intent (last visited Sept. 1, 2016). For example, a defend-
ant acts with specific intent when the defendant harasses a victim with the
intent to cause some effect on the victim (e.g., to harass or cause fear in the
victim). See Fukuchi, supra note 25, at 306.
103. See 47 U.S.C.S. § 223(a)(1)(A); Goodno, supra note 77, at 148.
104. See Goodno, supra note 77, at 148.
105. 18 U.S.C.S. § 2261A (2016); see also Fukuchi, supra note 25, at 299.
106. 18 U.S.C.S. § 2261A.
107. Id.
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address many forms of cyberharassment and cyberstalking re-
mains limited.108
2. State Laws
State laws can sometimes fill in the gaps formed by federal law
but are inconsistent in doing so due to varying definitions of
cyberharassment and cyberstalking by state legislatures.109
Some states passed laws to specifically address online harass-
ment, while others amended their preexisting harassment laws
to include online activity.110Massachusetts, as an example, de-
fines cyberharassment as a felony offense and requires a “pat-
tern of conduct” (e.g., at least three incidents) directed at a spe-
cific person that would cause a reasonable person “substantial
emotional distress”; Massachusetts’ cyberharassment statute,
however, does not actually reference the Internet or computer
communications.111 Under California’s misdemeanor statute, re-
peated and annoying or harassing calls with another person is
108. There is growing momentum to pass laws relating to cyberbullying
against minors. Though it failed, the findings of the Megan Meier Cyberbully-
ing Prevention Act show that the law was brought to the U.S. Congress due to
harassment of minors specifically. See H.R. Res. 1966, 111th Cong. (2009). An-
other bill (that also did not pass) was brought to the U.S. Congress in 2011
after Tyler Clementi, a homosexual student, was cyberbullied by his room-
mate, who recorded Clementi kissing a male student without Clementi’s
knowledge and streamed the webcam feed so that other students could watch.
See S.R. 540, 112th Cong. (2011); Ian Parker, The Story of a Suicide, NEW
YORKER (Feb. 6, 2012), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/02/06/the-
story-of-a-suicide. Cyberbullying laws, however, would not help adult victims
such as Zoe Quinn.
109. Fukuchi, supra note 25, at 299; see also Goodno, supra note 77, at 140–
47.
110. Examples of state statutes that specifically address online harassment
or stalking include: ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-41-108(a) (2016); LA. STAT. ANN. §
14:40.3 (2016); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW. § 3-805 (LexisNexis 2016); MICH.
COMP. LAWS SERV. § 750.411s (LexisNexis 2016); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §14-
196.3 (2016); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-152.7:1 (2016); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3C-
14a (LexisNexis 2016). Examples of state statutes that include electronic and
other communications are: CAL. PENAL CODE § 653m (Deering 2016); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 43A(a) (LexisNexis 2016); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 644:4
(LexisNexis 2016); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.30 (LexisNexis 2016); OHIO REV.
CODEANN. § 2917.21 (LexisNexis 2016); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2709 (LexisNexis
2016); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.07 (West 2015).
111. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 43A(a); see also Commonwealth v. Welch,
444 Mass. 80, 89 (2005); Commonwealth v. Walters, 472 Mass. 680 (2015).
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criminalized, regardless of whether or not the victim experi-
enced emotional distress or fear.112 The statute was amended in
1998 to include electronic communications, but it was not other-
wise updated to address online-specific concerns, such as ano-
nymity, disseminating private information to persons other than
the victim, and other such issues. California’s felony crime re-
quires that a person receive a threat suggesting an imminent
and specific threat to the person’s safety, but, similar to the mis-
demeanor statute, it does not address online-specific concerns
that can arise in cyberharassment and cyberstalking inci-
dents.113
Currently, only a handful of states have cyberharassment and
cyberstalking statutes that specifically address online communi-
cations. The Arkansas Code, for example, defines cyberharass-
ment as a misdemeanor offense that criminalizes the sending of
a computerized message that contains the threat of physical in-
jury or lewd or obscene language, which “frighten[s], intimi-
date[s], threaten[s], abuse[s], or harass[es] another person.”114
The Arkansas Code, however, still only criminalizes communi-
cations sent to a victim for the purpose of threatening physical
injury or conveying profane language, of which the former con-
stitutes a threat of offline harm. The statute thus does not cover
threats that involve online-specific activity (such as releasing
private information, hacking, and other such actions). Michi-
gan’s Penal Code provides one of the few examples of a state
cyberharassment and cyberstalking law that addresses online-
specific consequences and behaviors. Under Michigan’s Penal
Code, a perpetrator commits a felony when he or she has reason
to believe that the posting of an online message will cause others
to send unwanted messages to the victim and would cause the
victim emotional distress.115 In addition to online-specific con-
cerns regarding communications and the nature of those com-
munications, only some states criminalize anonymous commu-
112. CAL. PENAL CODE § 653m(b).
113. CAL. PENAL CODE § 422 (Deering 2016).
114. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-41-108(a).
115. MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 750.411s.
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nications within their cyberharassment and cyberstalking stat-
utes.116 Other states fail to have any law addressing online har-
assment.117 Thus, many states include very different elements
in their cyberharassment and cyberstalking statutes, or fail to
address online-specific issues in their statutes. As a result, the
clear lack of consensus between the states and the federal gov-
ernment in how to define various elements of cyberharassment
and cyberstalking crimes leads to vast inconsistencies in
whether victims can seek a legal remedy in different jurisdic-
tions throughout the United States.118
Criminal intent standards can also vary widely based on state
jurisdiction.119 While Arkansas’ definition of cyberharassment
may in some ways be fairly broad (in the sense that Arkansas’
definition of cyberharassment and cyberstalking criminalizes a
wider variety of activity), Arkansas requires specific intent on
the part of the perpetrator to cause harm to another.120 Massa-
chusetts does not require specific intent on the part of the per-
petrator to cause a particular harm to another (i.e., a person in
Massachusetts need not intend to harass or threaten the victim),
116. States with laws specifying that the accused may be anonymous include:
Alabama (ALA. CODE § 13A-11-8(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2016)); Arizona (ARIZ. REV.
STAT. § 13-2912 (LexisNexis 2016)); Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-111
(2016); Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 711-1106 (LexisNexis 2016)); and Ken-
tucky (KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 525.080 (LexisNexis 2017)). Such clauses can be
helpful, as they allow for victims to reasonably perceive a threat, even if they
do not know the accused and, therefore, cannot know whether the accused was
likely or able to follow through on the threat. Most states, however, do not have
such clauses including anonymity in their statutes. See State Legislation, su-
pra note 27.
117. State Legislation, supra note 27. Many of these states do have statutes
addressing cyberbullying, including Idaho and Kansas. See IDAHO CODE § 18-
917A (2016); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-8256 (LexisNexis 2017). As noted above,
however, cyberbullying generally is specific to minors and, therefore, generally
cannot be applied to harassment committed by adults against other adults.
118. See Goodno, supra note 77, at 158–97; Fukuchi, supra note 25.
119. See Goodno, supra note 77, at 158–97.
120. See ARK. CODEANN. § 5-41-108(a) (2016) (“A person commits the offense
[cyberharassment] . . . if, with the purpose to . . . harass another person, the
person sends a message.”); see also MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 43A(a) (Lex-
isNexis 2016). Malice is defined by “wilful [sic] doing of . . . unlawful acts, with-
out justification or mitigation,” such that “any reasonably prudent person
would have foreseen the actual harm that resulted.” Commonwealth v. O’Neil,
67 Mass. App. Ct. 284 (2006). In O’Neil, the court noted the unlikelihood that
“the Legislature would have expected a specific intent to alarm or harm the
victim under these circumstances.” O’Neil, 67 Mass. App. Ct. at 293.
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but it does require the perpetrator to have maliciously acted in
a way that caused a reasonable person to be distressed.121 Cali-
fornia law requires a perpetrator to make a threat “with the spe-
cific intent that the statement . . . be taken as a threat” and also
uses an objective standard from the victim’s perspective to de-
termine whether it was reasonable for the person to have feared
an imminent threat.122 InMichigan, there is an evenmore varied
mix of standards for either the perpetrator or the victim.123 For
example, a perpetrator is required to have specific intent to
cause conduct that would harass the victim, but he need not
have specific intent in causing separate unconsented contact
that would cause the victim emotional distress.124 Further, a
prosecutor must also show that a victim both subjectively suf-
fered emotional distress, by feeling frightened or harassed from
conduct that arises from the perpetrator’s message, and that, ob-
jectively, a reasonable person would have suffered emotional dis-
tress and would have felt frightened or harassed.125 Various
other states have differing intent standards for the perpetrator
and use different standards for the victim’s perspective.126 Dif-
ferent intent standards for cyberharassment and cyberstalking,
coupled with widely varying definitions of the crimes them-
selves, can affect the degree to which a victim or a prosecutor
can reasonably maintain a case against a perpetrator, who may
be located hundreds of miles away.127
121. O’Neil, 67 Mass. App. Ct. at 293.
122. CAL. PENAL CODE § 422 (Deering 2016). The California statute calls for
the victim to reasonably fear for their life due to the “unconditional, immediate,
and specific” nature of the threat. Id. § 422(a).
123. MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 750.411s (LexisNexis 2016).
124. Section 750.411s(a) of the Michigan code requires that the accused
“know[] or should have known” that the posting could cause a particular effect
on other perpetrators. Id. § 750.411s(a). Section 750.411s(b) of the Michigan
code, on the other hand, requires the specific intent of causing other perpetra-
tors to make the victim feel threatened or otherwise harassed. See id. §
750.411s(b).
125. Id.
126. As one example, New York requires an intent to offend or harass, but it
does not require an intent to cause emotional distress or other harms and does
not include a standard for analyzing whether or not the victim was harmed.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.30 (LexisNexis 2016).
127. For example, it may be less reasonable to argue that a defendant in-
tended to fulfill a threat to harm the victim if the perpetrator happens to live
thousands of miles away than it would be if the perpetrator lived next door.
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B. Defining Cyberharassment Internationally
Outside the United States, definitions of cyberharassment can
also vary greatly. Legal definitions of cyberharassment and cy-
berstalking can vary just as greatly between nations as they can
within the United States specifically. This section will examine
the scope of Canadian law (including the Canadian Criminal
Code, Nova Scotia’s CSA, and Ontario’s civil tort law) and recent
amendments to Australia’s federal Criminal Code Act of 1995 to
analyze how these countries define cyberharassment and cyber-
stalking in comparison to the United States. This section will
also analyze the Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime
(COC) (the leading international treaty specifically dealing with
online crimes) and will note its shortcomings with respect to the
scope treaty as it currently exists and its power (or lack thereof)
to affect the laws of its member states.
1. Canada
Much like the United States, Canada has a general federal
criminal harassment statute that can be used to prosecute per-
sons who harass others online.128 Section 264 of the Canadian
Criminal Code criminalizes conduct that causes another person
to reasonably fear for their safety, including following that per-
son around, repeatedly communicating with that person, watch-
ing that person’s home or work place, or threatening that person
in some manner.129 While the Canadian Criminal Code does not
specifically address online communication, it has been used to
prosecute individuals who have committed harassment130 using
online tactics, such as sexual harassment via texting, threaten-
ing to call the police on another, placing false information about
a victim on websites, tampering with a victim’s online accounts,
sending rape threats over the Internet, and various other online
behavior.131 Unlike the ICA of the United States, the Canadian
128. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46, s 264(1) (Can.).
129. Id. s 264(1), (2)(a)–(d).
130. The Canadian statute does not require harassment to comprise repeated
acts. While the statute’s definition of “harassed” includes many components,
including repeated acts, the components are intended to be taken as independ-
ent, individual synonyms of harassment, not as components that cumulatively
define harassment. See R. v. Kordrostami, 2000 CarswellOnt 554, paras. 6–7
(Can. Ont. C.A.) (WL).
131. R. v. A. (B.L.), 2015 CanLII 203, paras. 9–14 (BCPC) (Can.). Other be-
havior the defendant in R. v. A. admitted to committing, and which was subject
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Criminal Code specifies the requisite intent of the accused: the
accused act “knowing that another person is harassed or reck-
lessly as to whether the other person is harassed.”132 In other
words, a perpetrator must act with the intent that his or her
conduct is harassing the other person or must harass the other
person in such a manner that it would be unreasonable for the
perpetrator not to know that his or her conduct is harassing in
nature.133 The Canadian Criminal Code also requires that, re-
gardless of the nature of the accused’s actions, the victim must
reasonably fear for his safety.134 Thus, the Canadian Criminal
Code allows for a conviction if the perpetrator acts with either
specific intent or reckless intent. Further, the Canadian Crimi-
nal Code uses both an objective and subjective standard to ex-
amine the effect of the perpetrator’s actions on the victim. Spe-
cifically, the Canadian Criminal Code requires the victim to sub-
jectively fear for his or her safety and requires that fear to be
objectively reasonable.
Various provinces in Canada also have passed statutes that
have been used to prosecute cyberharassment and cyberstalk-
ing. Following the suicide of a student who endured cyberhar-
assment, Nova Scotia passed the CSA,135 which was the first law
passed in Canada that attempted to protect victims from online
harassment.136 The CSA allows two avenues for prosecuting chil-
dren for cyberbullying (i.e., cyberharassment and cyberstalking
performed between two minors).137Under the CSA, children who
to prosecution under the statute, included disrupting a woman’s internet ser-
vice after she refused to send the defendant sexual photos, posting an adver-
tisement on Craigslist with the victim’s real name indicating that she wanted
sex, and impersonating another victim on Skype to obtain sensitive infor-
mation about her from her friends. Id.
132. R.S.C. 1985, c C-46, s 264(1) (Can.).
133. See Karen D. Levin, La Cyberintimidation: Analyse Juridique, 8 CAN. J.
L. & TECH. 65, 69 (2010).
134. R.S.C. 1985, c C-46, s 264(1); see also Levin, supra note 133.
135. Hannah E.Y. Choo, Why We Are Still Searching for Solutions to Cyber-
bullying: An Analysis of the North American Responses to Cyberbullying Under
the Theory of Systemic Desensitization, 66 U.N.B.L.J. 52, 59 (2015).
136. Brett Ruskin,Court Strikes Down Anti-Cyberbullying Law Created After
Rehtaeh Parsons’s Death, CBC NEWS (Dec. 11, 2015, 11:45 AM),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/nova-scotia/cyberbullying-law-struck-down-
1.3360612.
137. See Cyber-safety Act, S.N.S. 2013, c 2, s 3(1)(b) (Can.). The Cyber-safety
act was invalidated by Crouch v. Snell. See Crouch v. Snell, 2015 NSSC 340,
para. 141; see also Cyberbullying/Stalking & Harassment, supra note 39.
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intend to cause fear, or even “humiliation,” to another child, or
who encourage or help another child humiliate or hurt the feel-
ings of another student are liable.138 A parent could also be cul-
pable for cyberbullying under the CSA merely by failing to pre-
vent their child from engaging in activities that the parent
knows would humiliate another child.139 The law was so broad
that it was quickly contested (and invalidated) in Nova Scotia
courts for violating Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms.140
Similarly, in 2016, the province of Ontario adopted a civil law
tort to prevent persons from publicly distributing “embarrassing
private facts.”141 Modeled after a similar tort established in the
province of Manitoba,142 Ontario’s Superior Court of Justice held
that a person violates a common law duty not to distribute em-
barrassing private facts about a victim when (1) the person dis-
seminates confidential information; (2) the person shares this
information, despite having an obligation to keep the infor-
mation in confidence; and (3) the information was shared to the
detriment of the victim.143 This common law tort was used
against a defendant accused of posting a sex tape of his ex-girl-
friend on a pornography website.144
2. Australia
Currently, Australia relies on an August 2015 amendment to
the Australian Criminal Code Act of 1995 (ACCA) to police
cyberharassment and cyberstalking.145 Multiple components of
138. See S.N.S. 2013, c 2, s 3(1)(b) (“[C]yberbullying’ means any electronic
communication . . . that is intended or ought reasonably be expected to cause
fear, intimidation, humiliation, distress or other damage or harm to another
person’s health, emotional well-being, self-esteem or reputation, and includes
assisting or encouraging such communication in any way.”).
139. See S.N.S. 2013, c 2, s 3(2).
140. Halifax Lawyer to Launch Charter Case Challenge of Cyber-Safety Act,
supra note 36.
141. Cyberbullying and the Law, MEDIA SMARTS, http://mediasmarts.ca/digi-
tal-media-literacy/digital-issues/cyberbulling/cyberbullying-law (last visited
Jan. 17, 2017).
142. Manitoba was the first (and until 2016, the only) province in Canada to
have a tort covering the distribution of private images. See Jane Doe 464533 v.
N.D., 2016 ONSC 541, para. 18.
143. Id. para. 21.
144. Id. para. 8.
145. See Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) ch 10 div 474 sub-div C (Austl.).
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the ACCA can be used to prosecute different levels of harass-
ment, such as §§ 474.14–474.17, which specifically relate to elec-
tronic communications.146 ACCA § 474.14 criminalizes one who
intentionally connects to the Internet to commit an offense
against an Australian law or against a foreign law.147 ACCA §
474.14 does not require proof that a victim of the offense felt or
reasonably could have felt a particular way after the offense was
committed (in other words, it does not impose any standards on
the perspective of the victim); it primarily focuses on the specific
intent of the accused.148 ACCA § 474.15 criminalizes the use of
the Internet to send a death threat with the intent that the re-
cipient of the threat will fear that the threat will be carried
out.149 As with ACCA § 474.14, ACCA § 474.15 requires specific
intent on the part of the accused, but it does not specify a partic-
ular intent or standard in analyzing the perspective of the vic-
tim.150 ACCA § 474.16 criminalizes sending online communica-
tions with the intent that the recipient will believe that a dan-
gerous substance or object has been, or will be, left in a place
(i.e., a threat that a bomb has been left in a public place).151 Sim-
ilar to ACCA § 474.14 and ACCA § 474.15, ACCA § 474.16 re-
quires specific intent on the part of the accused, but it does not
require a particular state of mind for the victim.152 Lastly, ACCA
§ 474.17 criminalizes sending internet messages in a manner
that reasonable people would interpret as being harassing, men-
acing, or offensive.153 Unlike §§ 474.14–474.16 of the ACCA,
ACCA § 474.17 does not require specific intent on the part of the
accused but does require using an objective standard to assess
the perspective of the victim.154
There are many benefits to the Australian cyberharassment
and cyberstalking section of the ACCA. Particularly due to the
flexibility that ACCA § 474.17 offers (in terms of conduct that
may fall under the purview of the statute), the ACCA does not
146. See id.
147. Id. s 474.14. This section of the code does not require proof that a victim
of that offense suffers any particular consequences (other than those specified
by the law); it primarily focuses on the intent of the accused.
148. Id.
149. Id. s 474.15.
150. Id.
151. Id. s 474.16.
152. Id.
153. Id. s 474.17.
154. Id.
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merely criminalize true threats or stalking, as is the case in
many U.S. jurisdictions, but can also be used (and has been
used) to prosecute defamation-related harassment suits155 and
posting of offensive messages on social networks.156 Thus, many
different aspects of cyberharassment and cyberstalking can be
covered under the statute (rather than only threats or conduct
that causes substantial emotional distress, as is present in much
of U.S. cyberharassment and cyberstalking law). Further, ACCA
§ 474.14, which criminalizes using the Internet to violate Aus-
tralian and foreign laws alike, may further extend the scope of
Australia’s ACCA to cover cyberharassment that violates the
laws of other countries or of states and territories of Australia
that are not necessarily embodied in the ACCA itself.157 Specifi-
cally, ACCA § 474.14 states:
A person is guilty of an offence if: (a) the person: (i) connects
equipment to a telecommunications network; and (ii) intends
by this to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, an offense
. . . and (b) the offense is: (i) a serious offense against a law of
the Commonwealth . . . or (ii) a serious offence against a foreign
law.158
155. Cullen vWhite [2003] WASC 153 (Austl.). In Cullen, the defendant made
several websites impersonating the plaintiff and insinuating that the plaintiff
was a pedophile, a fraud, and a dangerous felon. Id. paras. 7–8. The court ruled
in favor of the plaintiff and awarded punitive damages. See id.
156. R v Hampson [2011] QCA 132 (Austl.). In Hampson, the defendant
posted Facebook messages on the wall of a deceased child, including a picture
of the child with the caption: “WOOT IM DEAD.” Id. para. 12. The defendant
also posted a picture of the child Photoshopped into a photograph of a wood-
chipper with the caption: “This woodchipper can mince up any dead corpse or
your money back guarantee.” Id.
157. See Gregor Urbas, Why Julian Assange May Have a Case to Answer in
Australia, Despite What the AFP Says (or, Why Julia Gillard Might be Right)
(ANU Coll. of Law, Res. Paper No. 11-04, 2011), http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=1733666. While not specifically referring to cyberharassment, the paper
applies the ACCA to Julian Assange and theWikileaks scandal, which involved
the release of hundreds of classified documents, noting that “conduct that gives
rise to a serious offense against foreign law must also be such as to give rise to
a serious offence against a law of Australia, had the conduct occurred in Aus-
tralia.” Id. at 7. The paper goes on to note, therefore, that if the leaks had at
any point occurred in Australia, the alleged violators of U.S. law could also be
found culpable under the ACCA § 474.14. Id.
158. Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) ch 10 div 474 sub-div C s 474.14(1).
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Based on the language of the statute, the law allows Austral-
ian courts to prosecute Australians who harass others extrater-
ritorially (whether those Australians are acting within Australia
or acting within another jurisdiction at the time), so long as their
behavior violated both the laws of the country in which the vic-
tim resides and some Australian law.159As one example, had any
of Zoe Quinn’s perpetrators been Australian citizens who at-
tacked her while visiting the United States (i.e., while acting
outside of Australia),160 it is possible that they could have still
been prosecuted in Australia for their harassment (i.e., for vio-
lating a U.S. cyberharassment or cyberstalking law, so long as
the perpetrator’s conduct would have also been a serious offense
in Australia if performed in Australia).161 Further, had any of
Quinn’s perpetrators used the internet while present in Aus-
tralia in a manner that was meant to encourage U.S. citizens to
commit cyberharassment or cyberstalking crimes that would vi-
olate U.S. or Australian law, the ACCA could also be used to
prosecute that perpetrator.162 Said another way, in theory, the
ACCA allows Australia to bring criminal charges against people
whose online activities violate serious cyberharassment or cy-
berstalking laws and prosecute Australian citizens who encour-
age or help citizens of other nations commit offenses that would
violate both their domestic laws and the laws of Australia.
An additional benefit of the ACCA is that portions of the stat-
ute do not require any particular intent on the part of the perpe-
trator or proof that the victim was indeed afraid for his or her
life.163 For example, § 474.17(1) does not require intent on the
159. See Urbas, supra note 157, at 7.
160. Because it is a federal statute, the ACCA also allows Australian citizens
to bring claims against perpetrators in different Australian states. See Doe v
Yahoo!7 Pty Ltd [2013] QDC 181 (Austl.).
161. The ACCA defines a “serious offence” as an offense punishable for at
least five years. Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) ch 10 div 473.1 (Austl.). Further,
a serious offence against a foreign law specifically is defined as “an offense
against a law of a foreign country constituted by conduct that, if it had occurred
in Australia, would have constituted a serious offence against a law of the Com-
monwealth, State, or Territory.” Urbas, supra note 157, at 7; Criminal Code
Act 1995 (Cth) ch 10 div 473.1. In other words, assuming there was a state
where the person’s conduct would result in a five-year sentence in the United
States but only a three-year sentence in Australia, the victim would not be able
to use the ACCA to prosecute the perpetrator, as the analogous Australian
crime would not constitute a “serious offence.”
162. Urbas, supra note 157, at 7.
163. Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) ch 10 div 474 sub-div C s 474.
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part of a perpetrator to harass another; it merely requires evi-
dence that the perpetrator used the Internet in a harassing man-
ner.164 Similarly, § 474.15 does not require the victim to feel that
his or her life was in danger; rather, it necessitates that the per-
petrator intended to create that effect.165 By not requiring proof
that a victim suffered a particular consequence of the harass-
ment, the ACCA allows for the prosecution of harassing behav-
ior, even when the victim does not suffer specific harms specified
by the legislature. By requiring a particular intent for some
crimes and allowing general intent for other crimes, the ACCA
allows for both the prosecution of harassing behavior when it is
difficult to ascertain the true intent of the accused and protec-
tion for defendants who communicate harassing material with-
out realizing the severity of their actions.
3. International Law
The COC is the first, and only, binding international treaty for
regulating international cybercrimes.166 Drafted as a mecha-
nism for defining “a common criminal policy aimed at the pro-
tection of society against cybercrime,” the COC officially entered
into force in 2004 to encourage international cooperation in deal-
ing with online criminal acts that were increasingly becoming a
global, rather than merely an intrastate, issue.167 As of the date
of this publication, fifty-one states (including several nonmem-
bers of the Council of Europe, such as the United States, Can-
ada, and Australia) have ratified the COC.168
The COC, however, is a largely ineffective mechanism for
cyberharassment and cyberstalking victims who are seeking le-
gal recourse from an entity other than their resident state. The
COC, for example, calls for the criminalization of nine offenses,
including illegal access, illegal interception, data interference,
164. Id. s 474.17(1).
165. Id. s 474.15.
166. See Amalie M. Weber, The Council of Europe’s Convention on Cyber-
crime, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 425, 429 (2003); see also Details of Treaty No.
185, supra note 31; Budapest Convention and Related Standards, COUNCIL
EUR., http://www.coe.int/en/web/cybercrime/the-budapest-convention (last vis-
ited Jan. 17, 2017).
167. See Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, 2296 U.N.T.S. 167 (en-
tered into force July 1, 2004).
168. See Chart of Signatures and Ratifications of Treaty 185, COUNCIL EUR.,
http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/185/signa-
tures?p_auth=YLI5WLtp (last visited Jan. 17, 2017).
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system interference, misuse of devices, computer-related fraud
and forgery, dissemination of racist or xenophobic material, dis-
semination of child pornography, and copyright violations.169
Many of these offenses are unrelated to harassment or stalking
crimes and are thus futile to victims seeking a legal remedy for
online harassment. For example, provisions for copyright viola-
tions, child pornography, and computer-related fraud crimes
share little connection to cyberharassment and cyberstalking
crimes. Further, racist and xenophobic materials could poten-
tially be harassing in nature but would only cover a very narrow
subset of cyberharassment or cyberstalking offenses (e.g., they
would not cover threats unrelated to race or immigration status,
defamation, revenge porn, or other forms of online harassment
or stalking). Further, as the United States was one of the lead
drafters of the COC, many of the provisions suggested mirror
those that are already covered by U.S. law.170 As a result, many
of the issues associated with U.S. federal law are further repli-
cated in the COC. Specifically, the COC does not cover all forms
of cyberharassment and cyberstalking and is limited to a very
narrow subset of cyberharassment and cyberstalking offenses
(such as harassment that is specifically racial or xenophobic in
nature).
The COC is also overly broad, allowing member states to ratify
the treaty without enacting specific legislation that would target
particular cyberharassment or cyberstalking activity. As one ex-
ample, to the extent there are provisions in the COC that are not
expressed in existing U.S. legislation, the United States has
maintained that the COC is ambiguous enough that existing
U.S. law can be implied to cover the crimes specified in the con-
vention (and, consequently, that the United States need not
amend its existing laws to further accommodate other cyber-
crimes).171 Thus, the COC has not caused meaningful changes to
U.S. law, and (in its current state) it is unlikely to spur future
amendments to U.S. law. Similarly, with respect to Canada,
while the country ratified the COC in July 2015, the portion of
the federal Criminal Code used to prosecute cyberharassment
169. SeeWeber, supra note 166, at 431.
170. See id. at 435–36.
171. See id.
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and cyberstalking crimes has not been amended since 1993.172
Considering that U.S. and Canadian cyberharassment and cy-
berstalking laws have gaps with respect to the types of conduct
they cover, if the COC does not require these countries to amend
their laws to include additional forms of cyberharassment and
cyberstalking, then the COC could not serve as a mechanism for
forcing these two nations to fill in those gaps, and therefore al-
lows nations to operate with incomplete cyberharassment and
cyberstalking legislation.
III. LESSONS FROM CYBERHARASSMENT AND CYBERSTALKING
LAWS ACROSS THEGLOBE
Each jurisdiction has its own definition of cyberharassment
and cyberstalking. The United States, Canada, and Australia
criminalize widely different forms of cyberharassment and cy-
berstalking, causing victims to fall through the gaps established
by these definitions (e.g., when the victim’s experiences do not
correlate to the narrow definitions covered by that particular ju-
risdiction). Existing U.S. law also discourages law enforcement
from investigating cyberharassment and cyberstalking crimes
due to the costs of investigating these crimes and the relatively
low sentences prosecutors are likely to obtain if they successfully
prosecute these crimes. In Canada, conflicts between cyberhar-
assment and cyberstalking laws and constitutional rights have
slowed the progression and effectiveness of these laws. In Aus-
tralia, there are problems with the scope of Australian law with
respect to which forms of cyberharassment and cyberstalking
the laws do (or do not) cover. Australia’s laws, however, also offer
potential solutions to dealing with interstate actors and creating
sentencing structures that make investigation efforts propor-
tionate to the potential punishments of these crimes. This Part
will discuss gaps that exist in current U.S., Canadian, and Aus-
tralian cyberharassment and cyberstalking laws. These gaps ex-
ist not only in the ways in which jurisdictions define cyberhar-
assment and the intent standards used to examine defendants’
behavior but also in the ways in which the laws punish the ac-
172. Chart of Signatures and Ratifications of Treaty 185, supra note 168; see
alsoGARYP.RODRIGUES, CRANKSHAW’SCRIMINALCODEOFCANADA: LEGISLATIVE
HISTORIES (2016).
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cused. This Part will also discuss aspects of Canadian and Aus-
tralian law that do help cyberstalking and cyberharassment vic-
tims, such as clear intent standards and staggered sentencing.
A. Problems with U.S. Cyberharassment Laws
Federal laws of the United States have their fair share of com-
plications that prevent prosecutors from successfully winning
cyberharassment cases in court. The ICA, for example, is pri-
marily concerned with extortion173 rather than general threats
or intentional injury to others.174 Thus, many forms of harass-
ment, such as defamation and intentionally causing distress to
others, do not fall under the purview of the statute. Further, the
ICA has also been difficult to enforce due to a cloud of uncer-
tainty over what intent is actually required by the statute on the
part of the accused.175 In Elonis, the defendant was accused of
posting threatening messages on Facebook.176 Because the ICA
did not explicitly provide an intent standard for the defendant,
nine U.S. circuit courts decided that threats under the ICA only
required proof of general intent of the accused.177 Therefore, a
defendant could be found guilty, so long as the defendant sent
communications that could be reasonably construed as a
threat.178 In Elonis, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled, however,
that a general intent standard for the ICA would “reduce[] cul-
pability on the all-important element of the crime to negligence,”
a standard that is not typically inferred into criminal statutes
that lack an explicit mens rea.179 While the U.S. Supreme Court
ruled in Elonis that the ICA requires more than general intent,
the court declined to determine whether other standards of in-
tent, such as recklessness,180 would meet the requisite mens rea
173. See H.R. Res. 1966, 111th Cong. (2009).
174. See id.; United States v. Cooper, 523 F.2d 8 (6th Cir. 1975).
175. See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015).
176. Id. at 2006–07.
177. See id. at 2018 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
178. See id.
179. Id. at 2013.
180. Under the Model Penal Code, the mens rea of recklessly entails the fol-
lowing:
A person acts recklessly . . . when he consciously disregards
a substantial and unjustifiable risk that thematerial element
[of an offense] exists or will result from his conduct . . .
[where] [t]he risk must be of such a nature and degree that .
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under § 875(c) of the statute.181 Though litigants are now aware
that merely intending to post content that can be interpreted as
a threat is not on its own sufficient to violate § 875(c) of the ICA,
litigants and courts have no guidance as to what theory of intent
will prevail in such a case. Even if U.S. circuit courts come to an
agreement about what kind of intent is required for § 875(c),182
litigants would need to ask the U.S. Supreme Court to provide
further clarification of the statute.183
. . its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard
of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the ac-
tor’s situation.
MODEL PENALCODE § 2.02(2)(c) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962).
181. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2017 (“We think that is more than sufficient ‘justi-
fication’. . . for us [the court] to decline to be the first appellate tribunal” to
decide “whether recklessness suffices for liability under Section 875(c).”).
While judicial minimalism can, at some level, be understandable when dealing
with such a broad and complex area of law, it is not completely unprecedented
for justices to discuss, even in the abstract, the complexities of the law as well
as ponder what the U.S. Congress could do to address these issues going for-
ward. See Russomanno, supra note 97, at 15–16. It may be true that it was not
the U.S. Supreme Court’s place to decide for certain whether or not a reckless
standard or a subjective intent standard should prevail in a case such as Elo-
nis, but it is nevertheless disappointing that the majority (and to some extent,
the dissent) failed to bring attention to the issues that remain in the language
of the ICA, and in the landscape of cyberharassment and cyberstalking laws in
general, when general intent cannot be used as the standard of intent. By re-
fusing to bring that context into the discussion of the statute and the facts of
the case, the court arguably missed an opportunity to encourage the U.S. Con-
gress to further review the effects and scope of the federal laws currently in
effect and to consider alternative approaches to dealing with online activity.
Such discussions have certainly helped move legislation forward in areas out-
side of cyberharassment and cyberstalking. See generally id.
182. As of the date of publication, no lower court has directly addressed the
issue of recklessness post-Elonis.
183. See Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2013 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). For now, the Third Circuit, on remand, has only ruled that the statute
“contains both a subjective and objective component,” such that prosecutors
must prove that a defendant transmitted a communication for the purpose of
issuing a threat or knew that the communication would be perceived as a
threat and that a reasonable person would view the communication as a threat.
SeeUnited States v. Elonis, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 19453, *13 (2016). The court
ruled that, since the remand was predicated on a harmless error issue arising
from jury instructions, the court need not determine whether recklessness
would suffice as the requisite mens rea under the statute. See id. at *27. The
Fourth Circuit, having decided similar cases post-Elonis, has similarly ruled
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Similar to the ICA, the scope of the CA is also narrowly tai-
lored; many of the provisions in the CA are specifically directed
to preventing the transmission of lewd content.184 Another in-
herent limitation of the CA is that it requires a person to repeat-
edly initiate communications with a telecommunications device
“solely to harass” a specific person.185 Specific or “sole” intent in
cases of cyberharassment and cyberstalking, however, can be
problematic, as it is difficult to provide evidence that a defend-
ant’s one and only reason for performing an action was to harass
a specific person.186 Lastly, the CA only applies if the perpetrator
does not disclose his identity and communicates with the intent
to abuse, threaten, or harass a specific person.187 In the case of
Zoe Quinn, the CA would have allowed law enforcement to
charge any of the anonymous harassers who sent rape threats
and death threats directly to her, assuming an investigation
could uncover the specific person who created the message.188
The CA, however, would not allow for charges against Gjoni (e.g.,
a perpetrator she can identify) with respect to his blog posts be-
cause his blog posts were not anonymous.189 Additionally, based
on the plain language of the statute, the CA would also not allow
that Section 875(c) now requires “‘(1) that the defendant knowingly transmit-
ted a communication . . . ; (2) that the defendant subjectively intended the com-
munication as a threat; and (3) that the content of the communication con-
tained a “true threat” to kidnap or injure.’” Shah v. United States, 2016 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 157843, *14–15 (2016) (citing United States v. White, 810 F.3d
212, 220–21 (4th Cir. 2016)). In applying Elonis to another case, one state court
judge opined that merely adopting general intent for federal criminal statutes
that do not specify a mens rea would allow for civil standards of care to creep
into criminal statutes. People v. Salamon, 2016 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4279, *12–
28 (2016).
184. See 47 U.S.C.S. § 223(a)(1)(A), (B) (2016).
185. Id. § 223(a)(1)(E).
186. Fukuchi, supra note 25, at 306.
187. 47 U.S.C.S. § 223(a)(1)(C); see also Goodno, supra note 77.
188. See Dimeo v. Max, 433 F. Supp.2d 523 (E.D. Pa. 2006); United States v.
Tobin, 552 F.3d 29, 33 (1st Cir. 2009). Note that Quinn would not be able to,
say, hold a website or other publisher accountable for displaying the threats.
See Dimeo, 433 F. Supp.2d at 529–32. Courts have both held that it is im-
portant to allow free and uncensored dissemination of information over the
Internet and that websites would be facing an onerous burden if they had to
immediately deal with every comment from a user that could be considered
threatening. Id.
189. See Dimeo, 433 F. Supp.2d at 531. Similarly, the CA would not have
helped convict the defendant in Elonis, who did not anonymously post the
threats he made about his wife. See id.
2016] Making the Time Fit the Crime 461
Quinn to bring any claims against any perpetrators who posted
her personal information, defamatory statements, or even death
or rape threats, on a website or forum, as such posts would not
be communications to a specific person (regardless of whether
the perpetrators were identifiable).190 Thus, the limits of the CA
(which is only directed to crimes where a person is directly har-
assing a person anonymously) prevent many online harassers
and stalkers from being prosecuted under this federal law. The
ISPAA is not as narrowly tailored as the ISA or the CA, as the
ISPAA covers both conduct that causes a victim to fear for his or
her safety and causes a victim substantial emotional distress.191
The ISPAA, however, includes a specific intent standard that
can be difficult to prove in cases involving conduct that is wholly
online.192
Additionally, state laws can vary in their coverage of cyberhar-
assment because of the way they define conduct and intent suf-
ficient for criminalization in their statutes.193 The inconsisten-
cies between states can greatly affect what kind of legal recourse
litigants have across the country.194 For example, in California
andMassachusetts, prosecutors would have to show repeated at-
tempts of harassment to win a cyberharassment suit.195 Con-
versely, in Michigan and Arkansas, one incident could suffice.196
These inconsistencies can cut both ways.197 For example, a de-
fendant living in one state could publish content online without
any notion of where the subjects of the content live within the
United States. Additionally, a defendant living in one state and
acting against another person in another state could believe that
each state generally follows the same definition of cyberharass-
ment or cyberstalking as his or her own. He or she could be just
190. 47 U.S.C.S. § 223(a)(1)(C).
191. 18 U.S.C.S. § 2261A (2016).
192. Id.; see also Fukuchi, supra note 25.
193. See supra Part II. See generallyGoodno, supra note 77; State Legislation,
supra note 27; Fukuchi, supra note 25.
194. See generally Goodno, supra note 77; Fukuchi, supra note 25.
195. See CAL. PENALCODE § 653m(b) (Deering 2016) (noting that a defendant
would be guilty if he or she “[m]akes repeated telephone calls or makes re-
peated contact by means of an electronic communication device”); Common-
wealth v. Robinson, 444 Mass. 102, 109 (2005).
196. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-41-108(a) (2016) (sends “a” message); MICH.
COMP. LAWS SERV. § 750.411s (LexisNexis 2016) (“A person shall not post a
message. . . .”).
197. See generally Goodno, supra note 77; State Legislation, supra note 27.
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as surprised to find out that another state has a much more le-
nient definition of the crime. A person at risk of being accused of
cyberharassment or cyberstalking, therefore, would effectively
need to have working knowledge of every cyberharassment and
cyberstalking law in the country to know for sure whether a post
he or she believes is harmless may nonetheless qualify as a crim-
inal offense in a specific state.
Even if these gaps in current U.S. cyberharassment and cyber-
stalking laws were fixed, however, there would still be a need to
incentivize law enforcement to investigate cyberharassment and
cyberstalking cases to gather enough facts to prosecute cyber-
harassers in the first place. As previously noted, U.S. law en-
forcement may be reluctant to step in and investigate cyberhar-
assment and cyberstalking crimes when the punishment for the
crime is not proportional to the scope of the work required to
investigate the crime.198 Because law enforcement may not be
trained in investigating sophisticated Internet matters, law en-
forcement often requires specialized training by personnel (e.g.,
in federal agencies) who have experience investigating cyber-
crimes.199 The cost of such investigations can cost as much as
$2,500–$3,500 for individuals and attorneys seeking to perform
their own private investigations.200 This cost could be even
greater for law enforcement agencies that must send officers to
certification programs or classes to learn cybercrime investiga-
tion techniques or for agencies that would need to hire a consult-
ant or an additional officer who can perform such techniques.201
These costs are not, however, always proportionate to the level
of punishment that a cyberharassment or cyberstalking statute
198. Hess, supra note 19.
199. See id.
200. See Get a Quote, CYBER INVESTIGATION SERVICES (2013),
http://www.cyberinvestigationservices.com/internet-stalking/get-a-quote/.
201. As one study notes, some local law enforcement agencies may not just
lack a computer expert; they may also lack an investigative officer who has
relevant familiarity with the Internet in general. As a result, many law en-
forcement agencies may be unable to grasp the impact of cyberharassment and
may even recommend that victims just turn off their computers. SeeU.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, CYBERSTALKING: A NEW CHALLENGE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
INDUSTRY – AREPORT FROM THE ATTORNEYGENERAL TO THE VICE PRESIDENT 10
(1999), http://www.schmalleger.com/pubs/Cyberstalking_Report.pdf; see also
Hess, supra note 19; CHRISTA MILLER, CYBER STALKING & BULLYING – WHAT
LAWENFORCEMENTNEEDS TOKNOW 2 (2006), http://www.ncdsv.org/images/Cy-
berStalkingBullying—WhatLENeedstoKnow.pdf.
2016] Making the Time Fit the Crime 463
may carry. In the United States, sentences for cyberharassment
can also vary widely in different states and at the federal level.
Under the ICA, a perpetrator could face up to five years in prison
and/or a fine of up to $1,000.202 Under the CA, perpetrators can
face up to two years in prison and/or a fine of up to $250,000.203
In contrast, under California law, perpetrators may face no more
than one year in prison.204 In Michigan, unless the perpetrator
violates a restraining order, a credible threat is issued against
the victim and/or his family, the victim is a minor, or the defend-
ant is repeat offender of the same cyberharassment crime, the
perpetrator faces a jail sentence of two years and a fine of no
more than $5,000.205 In Massachusetts (where Quinn resided at
the time of the blog posts and subsequent backlash), even if pros-
ecutors were able to win a case against Gjoni, he would have
faced no more than two and a half years in prison, with a possi-
ble fine of no more than $1,000.206 In Arkansas and in New York,
however, a conviction would only be considered a Class A misde-
meanor.207
Because many of these laws were adapted from offline harass-
ment laws, the sentences are comparable to offline harassment
sentences.208 Many of the sentences, however, are largely inade-
quate for online harassment. For example, investigating online
harassment comes with costly challenges that may not be appli-
cable to offline harassment investigations (e.g., if investigators
do not have working knowledge of Internet investigation tech-
niques).209 If it would cost $2,500 and several months to deter-
mine the identity of a person sending a death threat to a victim,
202. 18 U.S.C.S. § 875(c) (2016).
203. 47 U.S.C.S. § 223 (2016); 18 U.S.C.S. § 3571 (2016).
204. CAL. PENAL CODE § 422 (Deering 2016).
205. MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 750.411s (LexisNexis 2016).
206. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 43A(a) (LexisNexis 2016).
207. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-41-108(b) (2016); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.30 (Lex-
isNexis 2016).
208. For example, in California, a defendant may face up to a year in jail for
cyberstalking; the same defendant, had his conduct occurred offline, would also
face up to a year in jail or a fine of up to $1,000. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 422,
646.9. Notably, California’s offline stalking law also includes provisions to fur-
ther punish repeat offenders, while its cyberstalking law does not. See CAL.
PENAL CODE §§ 653m(b), 646.9(c); see also ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-41-108(b), § 5-
71-208(b) (both online and offline harassment is a Class A misdemeanor);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 43A(a) (LexisNexis 2016) (covers both offline stalk-
ing and cyberstalking); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 750.411s.
209. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 201; see also Hess, supra note 19.
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but a prosecutor could at best only obtain a sentence of two years
and a $1,000 fine if the case were to be tried, it is easy to see why
many prosecutors and law enforcement agencies may view the
effort as disproportionate to the ultimate sentence that the ac-
cused would receive for the crime. Thus, the widely inconsistent
definitions of what it means to harass or stalk a person over the
Internet (that prevent many forms of cyberharassment from be-
ing covered within any particular jurisdiction), the widely incon-
sistent intent requirements or standards used in different juris-
dictions, the lack of law enforcement training on online crimes,
and the disproportionality between the cost of providing such
training and the sentences imposed for cyberharassment and cy-
berstalking crimes in many jurisdictions each contribute to a
U.S. body of law that leaves victims of cyberharassment and cy-
berstalking vulnerable.
B. Problems and Solutions Found in International Cyberhar-
assment and Cyberstalking Laws
International approaches to cyberharassment and cyberstalk-
ing law also have their own issues that can prevent them from
adequately criminalizing cyberharassment and cyberstalking.
As is the case with the United States, international, Canadian,
and Australian law have different definitions of cyberharass-
ment and cyberstalking that, to varying degrees, do not allow for
a full variety of cyberharassment and cyberstalking acts to be
criminalized. In their attempts to cover more versions of cyber-
harassment and cyberstalking, at least some Canadian laws
have clashed with Canadian constitutional laws. On the other
hand, there are features of these laws that do solve some issues
that remain in U.S. law. For example, the Canadian Criminal
Code includes an intent standard that clarifies what prosecutors
need to prove to satisfy elements of cyberharassment and cyber-
stalking. Additionally, Australian cyberharassment and cyber-
stalking laws include numerous mechanisms that broaden the
scope of the written law and which provide a staggered sentenc-
ing structure that includes stricter punishments for these types
of crimes. Each of these features are useful for determining ways
to improve (or not change) existing cyberharassment and cyber-
stalking laws in other jurisdictions.
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1. Canada
While Canadian federal law is a slight improvement over U.S.
law due to its inclusion of an intent standard, nonetheless, it is
not perfect. As previously noted, the Canadian Criminal Code
requires the accused to act “knowing that another person is har-
assed or recklessly as to whether the other person is har-
assed.”210 Canada’s Criminal Code, which explicitly describes
both specific and reckless standards of intent for the accused,
also requires that the victim reasonably fear for his or her safety
in order for the accused to be convicted.211 Thus, victims such as
Zoe Quinn, who are undoubtedly harmed by having personal and
private information disclosed to the public online, but who may
not fear for their personal safety as a result of those specific ac-
tions, may be unable to seek legal recourse in Canada.212 Cana-
dian lower courts have varied interpretations of the fear element
of the statute,213 with the most liberal courts being willing to
waive the element as a requirement in extreme cases, including
those involving the disclosure of intimate or obscene content.214
There remains a question, however, of how this element would
be interpreted by the Canadian Supreme Court.215 This results
in inconsistency in how the Canadian Criminal Code is then ap-
plied.216
Similarly, Canadian provinces also lack effective cyberharass-
ment legislation. Just recently, the Nova Scotia Supreme Court
ruled that the CSA violates Subsections 2(b) and 7 of the Cana-
dian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which protect free speech
and “principles of fundamental justice,”217 and invalidated the
210. R.S.C. 1985, c C-46, s 264(1) (Can.).
211. Id.; see also Levin, supra note 133.
212. Levin, supra note 133.
213. Id.
214. See R. v. Barnes, 2010 ABQB 285 (Can.).
215. Levin, supra note 133. As in the U.S. federal courts system, the Cana-
dian Supreme Court is the highest appellate court for cases in the federal sys-
tem and renders final judgments regarding how to interpret statutory and com-
mon law matters. See The Judicial Structure, CAN. DEP’T JUST. (July 25, 2015),
http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/just/07.html.
216. See Crouch v. Snell, 2015 NSSC 340, para. 141; Ruskin, supra note 136.
217. Subsection 2(b) guarantees “freedom of thought, belief, opinion and ex-
pression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication.”
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Constitution Act, 1982, c 11, s 2(b) (Can.). Section
7 guarantees “the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right
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entire act.218 Specifically, in the seminal case, Crouch v. Snell,
the court ruled that speech that “falls short of violence or threats
of violence . . . [are] within the sphere of conduct protected by
s.2(b)”; thus, the CSA’s prohibition of speech that was nonthreat-
ening in nature (such as speech that was merely humiliating)
violated Subsections 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.219 Further, the court ruled that the CSA’s attempt to
control or restrict speech (i.e., by restricting harassing or humil-
iating speech) violated fundamental freedoms embodied in the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.220 As of the date of
this publication, the Nova Scotia Legislature has not yet passed
legislation to replace the CSA. Thus, Nova Scotia, the pioneer in
Canadian online harassment law, has been forced to return to
the drawing board to construct more limited legislation. Being
that the CSA was deemed unconstitutional in Canada, it is also
unlikely to be passed in the United States, where legislatures
and courts tend to be more hesitant about restricting free
speech.221 For example, in the United States, only narrow cate-
gories of speech are constitutionally unprotected (including true
threats, speech intended to incite others to commit criminal con-
duct, and some expression of highly confidential information).222
A law such as the CSA, which restricts the transmission of not
only threats but also content that may humiliate a person, would
ultimately not fall under these narrow categories of speech.
Thus, were the U.S. Congress to pass a similar law, it would just
as quickly be in the same position as the legislature of Nova Sco-
tia.
Ontario’s cyberharassment tort carries with it additional is-
sues. For example, Ontario’s civil tort, as it is defined currently,
only covers the dissemination of embarrassing private facts.223
not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of funda-
mental justice.” Id. s 7. The “principles of fundamental justice” have generally
referred to “‘basic tenets and principles’” of the Canadian judicial process, such
as procedural fairness and a general judicial duty to act fairly in legal proceed-
ings. See J. M. Evans, The Principles of Fundamental Justice: The Constitution
and the Common Law, 29 OSGOODEHALL L.J. 51, 55 (1991).
218. See Crouch, 2015 NSSC, para. 221.
219. Id. para. 106.
220. Id. paras. 111–12.
221. See Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech in the United States and Canada, 55
LAW&CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS, no. 1, 1992, at 5, 8.
222. See Volokh, supra note 8.
223. Cyberbullying and the Law, supra note 141.
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The tort, therefore, does not cover many forms of cyberharass-
ment or cyberstalking, including threats or other forms of har-
assment that do not involve divulging embarrassing private in-
formation. Further, as the law is a tort, a perpetrator must have
a duty to the victim to not disseminate the private information
(or, generally speaking, must violate a duty to the victim to be
found liable for the offense).224 Many cyberharassment or cyber-
stalking perpetrators, however, are unlikely to have an obliga-
tion or a duty to the victim to not release information. For exam-
ple, there would generally be no understanding between a victim
and an anonymous perpetrator that the latter would not release
the victim’s private information. Since the tort was first created
in 2016, it is unclear, as of the time of this publication, how far
courts would be willing to stretch a duty between a victim of
cyberharassment and a party who acts against the victim, and
the extent to which the tort will be applicable to instances where
parties do not know each other or have established an under-
standing of confidence.
On a positive note, cyberharassment crimes in Canada consist-
ently allow for strong punishments against defendants convicted
of cyberharassment. For example, cyberharassment convictions
can carry a prison term of up to ten years in Canada under fed-
eral law.225 Even under Nova Scotia’s now-defunct law, cyber-
bullying was a tort subject to general, special, aggravated, and
punitive damages.226 The higher jail sentences in Canada, if sim-
ilarly implemented in the United States, may provide the proper
incentive for U.S. law enforcement to investigate more cyberhar-
assment cases.227 Said another way, as law enforcement has spe-
cifically pointed to the small maximum sentences for various
cyberharassment and cyberstalking crimes in the United States
as a hurdle for justifying investigating such crimes,228 the
United States should take note of the fact that countries, such
as Canada, have passed statutes that carry much harsher sen-
tences and consider raising the sentences of its own cybercrimes
to more closely reflect those of other nations.
224. See Jane Doe 464533 v. N.D., 2016 ONSC, para. 21.
225. See R.S.C. 1985, c C-46, s 264(1) (Can.).
226. Cyber-safety Act, S.N.S. 2013, c 2, s 3(1)(b) (Can.).
227. See Hess, supra note 19.
228. Id.
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2. Australia
Similar to U.S. statutes, under portions of the ACCA, proving
the intent of the perpetrator can be difficult due to the nature of
the intent required for certain portions of the statute.229 Portions
of the ACCA require different showings of intent by the accused,
including (1) intent to commit a serious offence, (2) intent to
cause a victim to fear that a threat would be carried out, or (3)
intent to cause a victim to believe a dangerous substance or ob-
ject was placed in a particular location.230 For situations such as
Zoe Quinn’s, where many of the perpetrators are anonymous and
may have only sent one message to Quinn, it may still be easy
for defendants to simply deny that they had an intent to harass
or harm the victim.231 Because the victim’s experience is not
taken into account, a court need not consider negligence or reck-
lessness on the part of the perpetrator.232
Taken in the aggregate, however, the ACCA appears to provide
adequate protections for all types of cyberharassment. Namely,
the ACCA covers a number of different forms of cyberharass-
ment and cyberstalking, including threats, defamation, disclos-
ing private information, and other types of cyberharassment and
cyberstalking.233 The ACCA also requires multiple degrees of in-
tent for particular types of cyberharassment and cyberstalking
(including specific intent for the accused for the crimes that
carry higher sentences and general intent for the accused for
crimes that carry lesser sentences).234 Finally, the ACCA in-
cludes provisions that guarantee prosecution of persons with
some kind of connection to Australia if the conduct violates at
least some foreign laws.235
Importantly, the ACCA does not necessarily require that a
threat be sent directly to the victim, allowing, for example, for
charges to be brought against perpetrators who post threats on
229. See Fukuchi, supra note 25.
230. See Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) ch 10 div 474 sub-div C s 474.14–
474.17 (Austl.).
231. Id.
232. Australian courts take the effects of the alleged cyberharassment or cy-
berstalking on the victim into consideration with respect to sentencing, but
they do not factor into the determination whether or not the defendant is actu-
ally guilty. See Cullen v White [2003] WASC 153 (Austl.); R v Hampson [2011]
QCA 132 (Austl.).
233. See supra Part II.
234. Id.
235. Id.
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their personal Facebook page that are directed toward other per-
sons.236 Additionally, similar to the Canadian Criminal Code
law, the ACCA tends to be more punitive of defendants convicted
of cyberharassment than U.S. federal or state law. ACCA § 474
includes staggered sentencing depending on the severity of the
crime. For example, for death threats, perpetrators can receive
up to ten years in jail.237 For threats of harm, perpetrators can
receive up to seven years in jail.238 And for conduct that is men-
acing or offensive, a perpetrator could face up to three years in
jail.239 As with Canadian sentences, Australia’s higher jail sen-
tences could certainly justify the extra months that may be spent
investigating online crimes and could attach more importance to
cyberharassment claims, which could help convince law enforce-
ment to invest the extra resources necessary to investigate such
crimes.240
Further, including general intent standards on the part of the
accused, for at least some crimes, allows for easier prosecution
of those forms of cyberharassment and cyberstalking. For exam-
ple, by not requiring a finding of specific intent on the part of the
accused, prosecutors can pursue cases against defendants, even
when their intentions may be ambiguous or difficult to prove. On
the other hand, by still including a specific intent standard for
the forms of cyberharassment and cyberstalking that carry
236. In a recent landmark case, an Australian man pled guilty to such a
charge after posting rape threats on his Facebook page. See Elahe Izadi, Rape
Threats on a Stranger’s Facebook Photo Could Land a Man in Prison. Why
That’s a Big Deal, WASH. POST (June 22, 2016), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2016/06/22/rape-threats-on-a-strangers-fa-
cebook-photo-could-land-a-man-in-prison-why-thats-a-big-deal/?tid=sm_fb.
The defendant did not ultimately serve jail time, as the magistrate judge ulti-
mately decided that the comments did not incite rape and that the defendant
had paid for his offensive comments already by being maligned at trial. See
Zane Alchin Given Good Behavior Bond for Making Facebook Threats About
Olivia Melville Tinder Profile, ABC NEWS (July 28, 2016, 10:35 PM),
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-07-29/internet-troll-zane-alchin-sentenced-
over-tinder-profile-threat/7671674. The notion that a person could be convicted
of such a crime at all, however, demonstrates an interesting difference in how
Australian law is currently equipped to deal with online harassment in com-
parison to U.S. law (in view of Elonis).
237. See Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) ch 10 div 474 sub-div C s 474.15(1)
(Austl.).
238. Id. s 474.15(2).
239. Id. s 474.17(1).
240. See Hess, supra note 19.
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higher prison sentences, the ACCA still requires proof that the
accused intended to perform actions that are proportional to the
higher prison sentence. In doing so, the ACCA prevents defend-
ants from facing extended prison sentences without a determi-
nation that the defendant intended to commit a serious offense.
Finally, Australia’s provisions concerning foreign law address
the globalized nature of online communications. For example,
prosecutors in Australia can rely on provisions that criminalize
Australians’ cyberharassment or cyberstalking conduct that oc-
curs both outside Australia, or occurs inside Australia but in-
cites others outside of Australia to commit such actions. In this
sense, even when some of the conduct is not fully performed
within Australian borders or between Australian citizens, online
harassment and stalking can still be addressed. By criminaliz-
ing activity that extends past Australia’s borders via the Inter-
net, and which violates laws of other nations, the ACCA ad-
dresses crimes that, inherently, allow Australian citizens to har-
ass or stalk other Australian citizens, or citizens in other coun-
tries, while also taking into account the severity of foreign na-
tions’ criminal statutes in the process.
IV. A PROPOSEDMODEL STATUTE FORDEALING WITH
CYBERHARASSMENT AND CYBERSTALKING CRIMES
To address the problems with existing U.S. cyberharassment
law, the United States must adopt a new law that clarifies exist-
ing legal doctrines and incentivizes law enforcement to investi-
gate cyberharassment crimes. Specifically, the proposed Model
Statute offered herein seeks to create a uniform definition of
cyberharassment with an explicit intent standard that U.S.
courts can utilize in future litigation. Further, the proposed
Model Statute seeks to include sentencing structures that can
encourage law enforcement to investigate cyberharassment
crimes. This Part will then apply the proposed Model Statute to
the facts of both Zoe Quinn and the victim in Elonis to illustrate
how the amendments would substantially help prosecute these
and similar cyberharassment cases.
A. Analyzing the Components of the Proposed Model Statute
The proposed Model Statute would amend the existing ICA to
address many of the problems facing current cyberharassment
and cyberstalking laws in the United States. As an amendment
to a federal law, the proposed Model Statute would ensure that
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the types of cyberharassment and cyberstalking crimes covered
under the statute would affect all U.S. citizens uniformly, re-
gardless of the states where the defendant or the alleged victim
reside. To define a clearer standard of intent for the ICA, the
proposed Model Statute would include a recklessness standard,
similar to that found in the Canadian Criminal Code.241 Under
the proposed Model Statute, anyone who “knowingly or reck-
lessly” transmits threatening or harassing communications will
be found in violation of the statute.242 This amendment will solve
the primary point of contention in Elonis243 by specifying the
standard of intent required for each element of the statute. Spe-
cifically, the proposed Model Statute will allow courts to know
the particular intent standard required for a defendant to have
violated the statute and will also provide the court (and juries)
some flexibility in how they analyze the defendant’s perspec-
tive.244 The proposed Model Statute would further incorporate
aspects of existing criminal laws that would broaden the scope
of existing U.S. federal law, such as criminalizing activity that
encourages repeat behavior with third parties and criminalizing
activity other than true threats.
The proposedModel Statute would also include a lesser offense
with a general intent standard, such that a defendant need not
intend to cause distress to the victim, so long as the defendant
did in fact act in a way that caused such distress or encouraged
others to cause distress to the victim.245 This element both re-
flects how some U.S. state jurisdictions246 and Australia247 han-
dle intent standards for cyberharassment and makes explicit
what a defendant needs to know (or does not need to know) to
241. See R.S.C. 1985, c C-46, s 264(1) (Can.).
242. See infra app., sec. 3(a).
243. Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2013 (Alito, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). The use of a “recklessness” standard would not
only clarify the lens through which to analyze the defendant’s actions but
would also specify a standard that Justices Alito and Thomas have already
sanctioned in Elonis. See id.
244. This standard has been adopted by states as well, including California.
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 653m (Deering 2016).
245. See infra app., sec. 3(c)(e).
246. See Fukuchi, supra note 25, app. at 331–38.
247. Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) ch 10 div 474 sub-div C s 474.17(1)
(Austl.).
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have violated the statute.248 This would also serve as a solution
to a major point of contention in Elonis, where intent standards
under the ICA were (and to an extent, still are) ambiguous.249
The proposed Model Statute would also broaden the geograph-
ical scope of existing U.S. law. For example, the proposed Model
Statute would include provisions specifying that a person who
violates “a cybercrime law of a foreign nation”may still be liable
under the proposed Model Statute.250 Similar to how such provi-
sions work in Australia, such an amendment would be able to
provide further protections for persons who are attacked across
national borders.251
Finally, the proposed Model Statute would provide multiple
incentives for law enforcement to investigate cyberharassment
crimes. For example, the proposed Model Statute would revise
the ICA to include the staggered approach to punishment found
inMichigan law252 and in Australian law.253Under the staggered
approach, previous convictions under the proposed Model Stat-
ute would result in larger fines (e.g., $2,500–$5,000 in additional
fines) and/or prison sentences (e.g., up to six years of additional
prison time).254 Further, the proposed Model Statute would in-
clude a provision that would charge a defendant an additional
fine to be applied toward the costs associated with the investiga-
tion of the defendant’s actions.255 Specifically, a percentage of
the costs associated with the investigation would be paid by the
defendant, should the defendant be found guilty of the crime.
Because law enforcement has noted that costs associated with
investigating such crimes can be prohibitive,256 specifying that
the fines be directly applied to funding law enforcement costs for
248. In his dissenting opinion, U.S. Supreme Court Justice, Clarence
Thomas, expressed that general intent was already inherent in the original
statute. See Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2018 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The proposed
amendments would therefore make explicit what could already be reasonably
considered an inherent characteristic of the existing statute.
249. See id.
250. See infra app., sec. 3(c)(f).
251. See Urbas, supra note 157, at 7.
252. MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 750.411s (LexisNexis 2016).
253. Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) ch 10 div 474 sub-div C ss 474.15(1)–(2),
474.17(1).
254. See infra app., sec. 3(c)(g).
255. See id. sec. 3(c)(i).
256. Hess, supra note 19.
2016] Making the Time Fit the Crime 473
investigating the facts of the case would help to empower law
enforcement to investigate such crimes.
B. Applying the Proposed Model Statute to Zoe Quinn’s Experi-
ence
To an extent, Quinn’s multifaceted experiences with harass-
ment would have been better served under the proposed Model
Statute.257 The proposed Model Statute’s inclusion of instances
where a victim feels threatened or harassed, regardless of
whether a perpetrator’s threat is credible or intended to har-
ass,258 would have provided prosecutors with a cause of action
against the anonymous harassers that sent her death threats
and other distressing messages.259 The proposed Model Statute
would also have given prosecutors a cause of action against
Gjoni, whose blog posts could arguably be seen as harassment
by a reasonable person, even if Gjoni did not intend for Quinn to
feel harassed or threatened.260 The proposed Model Statute
would require inquiry into whether a reasonable person would
feel frightened, threatened, or harassed. This would protect per-
sons who make comments that are merely annoying or hurtful
and persons who send messages that a reasonable person would
interpret humorously. Additionally, the proposed Model Statute
would provide a way to prosecute individuals who encourage or
incite others to commit additional harassment against the vic-
tim,261 which, in Quinn’s circumstances, would have potentially
given prosecutors another claim against Gjoni, due to the fact
that his blog posts likely incited others to send death threats to
257. There are many aspects of cyberharassment and cyberstalking that are
not intended to be addressed by the ICA and would not be addressed by the
proposed Model Statute. Such offenses would include defamation and revenge
porn. Addressing solutions to the myriad types of cybercrime committed
against Quinn would be beyond the scope of this Note. Instead, this Note pri-
marily seeks to prevent threatening communications over the Internet, includ-
ing those that inspire others to participate in subsequent harassment.
258. See infra app., sec. 3(c)(e).
259. It can be difficult to argue that a threat is credible when it is sent by an
anonymous harasser. See Baer, supra note 75, at 160–61; Goodno, supra note
77, at 135–36. Creating causes of action that do not require the threat to be
credible, therefore, helps persons such as Quinn, who cannot prove that their
anonymous harassers could truly pose imminent threats to their safety.
260. See infra app., sec. 3(c)(e).
261. See id. sec. 3(c)(e). A similar element exists in Michigan law. See MICH.
COMP. LAWS SERV. § 750.411s (LexisNexis 2016).
474 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 42:1
Quinn.262 Specifically, a prosecutor would have been able to use
the proposed Model Statute to charge Gjoni with the crime of
acting in a harassing manner, by encouraging other parties to
harass Quinn through hacking attempts and anonymous mes-
sages, among others. This portion of the proposed Model Statute
would have applied irrespective of whether Gjoni intended to
harass or intended to incite additional harassment against
Quinn. In other words, the proposed Model Statute would have
provided several avenues of justice for Quinn who, under Mas-
sachusetts state law, laws of states other than Massachusetts,
and existing federal law, would otherwise largely be unable to
hold Gjoni and anonymous Internet harassers legally accounta-
ble for their vicious actions.263
C. Applying the Proposed Model Statute to Elonis
When applied to Elonis, the proposed Model Statute would
have allowed the government to prevail against the defendant.
The principal point of contention in the Elonis decision con-
cerned which standard of intent to apply to the defendant’smens
rea: in other words, whether the standard of intent could be gen-
eral intent264 or whether the standard had to be more than gen-
eral intent.265 The proposed Model Statute removes this uncer-
tainty by specifying that “recklessly” transmitting threatening
language would violate the statute.266 Further, the proposed
Model Statute would also include a lower-level offense that
would only require general intent on the part of the defendant
(i.e., that would not require the defendant to intend for the com-
munication to cause another to feel threatened or otherwise dis-
tressed).267 With either the reckless standard or the general in-
tent standard, the point of contention in Elonis would be ren-
dered moot. The court would have a clear intent standard with
which to instruct the jury, depending on which section of the pro-
posed Model Statute was being used to prosecute the defendant.
For example, the proposedModel Statute would have explicitly
advised the court that, for the highest-level offense (having a
262. See generally Elise, supra note 3; Dewey, supra note 2.
263. Volokh, supra note 8.
264. See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2018 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
265. See id.
266. See infra app., sec. 3(a).
267. See id. sec. 3(c).
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sentence of up to ten years and a fine of $1,000–$2,500), the jury
would need to determine whether the defendant knowingly or
recklessly created his threatening posts. Alternatively, for the
lower-level offense (having a sentence of a year and a fine of
$1,000–$2,500), the jury would have been instructed to deter-
mine whether the defendant’s posts would have caused a reason-
able person to feel terrorized, frightened, or otherwise dis-
tressed, regardless of whether the defendant knew or intended
the communication to have this effect on the recipient. Thus,
even if the government had been unable to prove that the de-
fendant knew that his posts would be interpreted as a threat,
the defendant would still have been found guilty under the pro-
posed Model Statute, so long as the defendant was found to be
acting recklessly or so long as the defendant was being charged
with the lesser offense. Additionally, because the intent stand-
ard of both offenses is explicitly outlined, future litigants would
not run the risk of losing cases due to an ambiguity over the
standard required to convict a defendant.
CONCLUSION
Individuals all over the globe continue to face various forms of
cyberharassment.268 As it stands today in the United States, a
person targeted for cyberharassment has limited recourse
against his or her harassers.269 Whether due to inconsistent or
vague definitions of cyberharassment270 or law enforcement that
is too ill-equipped, unwilling, or unable to fully investigate
cyberharassment cases, restitution and legal recourse in the
United States is inadequate.271 By amending existing U.S. fed-
eral law to address these issues, the amendments to the Model
Statute proposed herein would resolve numerous uncertainties.
The proposed Model Statute would provide much-needed up-
dates to the federal definitions of cyberharassment and cyber-
stalking, allowing cyberharassment and cyberstalking to be reg-
ulated in a uniform way across the country. The proposed Model
Statute would also simultaneously provide causes of action for
victims, such as those in Elonis and Zoe Quinn, that would in-
centivize law enforcement to investigate cyberharassment and
268. See Dewey, supra note 2; Dewey, supra note 12; Watt, supra note 12;
Tsukayama, supra note 12.
269. See supra Part III.
270. See supra Parts II, III.
271. See supra Part III.
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cyberstalking incidents to uncover evidence needed to success-
fully prosecute such crimes. Better yet, modifying U.S. law to
share features also found in the cyberharassment laws of other
nations, such as Canada and Australia, would further embrace
the international nature of the Internet (namely, that harassers
may perpetrate cyberharassment from anywhere in the
world).272 With the proposed Model Statute, Zoe Quinn could
have prevented her ex-boyfriend from publishing private infor-
mation to fuel an Internet war against her, the government
could have prevented individuals from posting violent threats
against their spouses over the internet, and countless others
could have used the overarching federal law to obtain consistent
legal recourse when faced with online harassment. If the United
States truly wishes to save other citizens from the traumas and
life-altering effects of cyberharassment and cyberstalking, it
must change its laws to address more victims and to entice law
enforcement to investigate the crimes to ensure that justice is
obtained for these victims.
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272. Because the Internet is accessible across the globe (see Internet Usage
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APPENDIX
A MODEL STATUTE
To amend Title 18 United States Code, with respect to cyber-
harassment.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE
This Act may be cited as the “Model Cyberharassment Preven-
tion Act.”
SECTION 2. FINDINGS
Congress finds the following:
[supra Part I]
SECTION 3. CYBERHARASSMENT
(1) IN GENERAL. – Section 875 of title 18, United States
Code, is amended by replacing Subsection 875(a) with the fol-
lowing:
(a) Whoever knowingly or recklessly transmits in inter-
state or foreign commerce any communication containing
any demand or request for a ransom or reward for the
release of any kidnapped person, shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
(2) Section 875 of title 18, United States Code, is amended
by replacing Subsection 875(c) the following:
(c) Whoever knowingly or recklessly transmits in inter-
state or foreign commerce any communication containing
any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure
the person of another, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than five ten years, or both.
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(3) Section 875 of title 18, United States Code, is amended
by adding after Subsection 875(d) the following:
(e) Whoever transmits in interstate or foreign commerce
any communication that would cause a reasonable per-
son who is a subject of the communication to suffer sub-
stantial emotional distress, and would cause a reasonable
person who is a subject of the communication to feel ter-
rorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or
molested, whether due to the nature of the communica-
tion or the foreseeable effect of the communications on
others, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than one year, or both.
(i) A person who transmits such a communication
need not know or intend that the communication
would cause a subject of the communication to suf-
fer substantial emotional distress or to feel terror-
ized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, har-
assed, or molested.
(f) Whoever knowingly or recklessly transmits in inter-
state or foreign commerce any communication that would
be prohibited under United States law, or a cybercrime
law of a foreign nation had the crime been committed in
the United States, shall be fined under this title or im-
prisoned not more than three years, or both.
(g) Whoever commits any of Subsections 875(a)–(f), who
has been previously convicted of any of Subsections
875(a)–(f), shall be liable for an additional fine of no less
than $2,500, and no more than $5,000, or imprisoned for
an additional term of no more than six years, or both.
(h) For purposes of Subsections 875(a)–875(c), and
875(e)–(f), the fine shall be no less than $1,000, and no
more than $2,500.
(i) Whoever commits any of Subsections 875(a)–(f), shall
be fined, in addition to the fine specified in Subsection
875(g) or 875(h), an amount equaling a percentage of
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costs associated with the investigation of said communi-
cations described in Subsections 875(a)–(f), said percent-
age being no less than 25 percent, and the total value of
the fine not to exceed $10,000.
